

# Rhetoric in European Culture and Beyond



KAROLINUM

Jiří Kraus

# Rhetoric in European Culture and Beyond

**Jiří Kraus**

---

Reviewed by:

PhDr. Světlá Čmejrková, DrSc.

Mgr. Jiří Lukeš, Th.D.

Published by Charles University in Prague

Karolinum Press

English translation by Petra Key

Editor Martin Janeček

Cover and layout by Zdeněk Ziegler

Typeset by Karolinum Press

First English edition

© Charles University in Prague, 2014

© Jiří Kraus, 2014

Translation © Petra Key, 2014

ISBN 978-80-246-2215-6

ISBN 978-80-246-2588-1 (online : pdf)



Charles University in Prague  
Karolinum Press 2015

[www.karolinum.cz](http://www.karolinum.cz)  
[ebooks@karolinum.cz](mailto:ebooks@karolinum.cz)



## CONTENTS

|                                                                                                  |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| <b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....                                                                        | 9   |
| History of Rhetoric – A Motionless History? .....                                                | 9   |
| <br><b>1. THE ORIGIN OF RHETORIC IN ANCIENT GREECE</b> .....                                     | 24  |
| The Search for Techné .....                                                                      | 24  |
| Protagoras’s Agonistic Rhetoric .....                                                            | 29  |
| First Teachers .....                                                                             | 31  |
| Ancient Rhetoric as a Model of Persuasive Communication .....                                    | 33  |
| Plato’s Unending Dispute with Rhetoric .....                                                     | 34  |
| Isocrates’s Programme of Rhetoric in Service of Political Culture .....                          | 38  |
| Aristotle as Ancient Rhetoric’s Pinnacle .....                                                   | 41  |
| On the Art of Persuasion in <i>Rhetoric to Alexander</i> .....                                   | 47  |
| <br><b>2. HELLENISTIC AND ROMAN RHETORIC</b> .....                                               | 50  |
| The Birth of Hellenistic Philology .....                                                         | 50  |
| Rhetorical Instruction in the Hellenistic Period .....                                           | 54  |
| Hermagoras of Temnos and the <i>Stasis</i> Theory .....                                          | 56  |
| Rhetoric in Ancient Rome .....                                                                   | 60  |
| <i>Rhetorica ad Herennium</i> ( <i>Ad C. Herennium de ratione dicendi libri quattuor</i> ) ..... | 61  |
| Cicero’s Perfect Orator as a Citizen, an Advocate of Law and a Politician .....                  | 65  |
| Quintillian’s <i>Institutes of Oratory</i> .....                                                 | 70  |
| Pliny the Younger and Tacitus on the Role of Rhetoric<br>in Imperial Rome .....                  | 73  |
| The Second Sophistic and Hermogenes’s Rhetoric as a <i>Stasis</i> System .....                   | 77  |
| <br><b>3. RHETORIC AND MEDIEVAL CHRISTIAN CULTURE</b> .....                                      | 84  |
| Rhetoric and the Seven Liberal Arts Allegory in Martianus Capella .....                          | 93  |
| Augustine of Hippo – Preacher, Rhetorician, Polemicist .....                                     | 94  |
| <i>Tópica Boethii</i> – Rhetoric in Service of Dialectics .....                                  | 99  |
| Cassiodorus’s Encyclopaedic View of the Christian World .....                                    | 102 |
| Isidore of Seville and the Origin of Scholastic Education .....                                  | 104 |
| Rhetoric as Part of Grammar: The Venerable Bede .....                                            | 105 |
| Alcuin of York: a Teacher of Wisdom and Eloquence .....                                          | 107 |
| Artes Praedicandi: The Art of Preaching in the Middle Ages .....                                 | 108 |
| Artes Dictaminis: The Art of Rhetoric’s New Face .....                                           | 114 |
| Artes Poetriae: Theory and Practice of Written Discourse .....                                   | 122 |
| Rhetoric in Medieval Byzantium .....                                                             | 130 |

#### **4. FROM HUMANISM TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT**

|                                                                                       |     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Rhetoric during Humanism and Renaissance .....                                        | 134 |
| Lorenzo Valla, a Renaissance Philologist .....                                        | 137 |
| George of Trebizond .....                                                             | 139 |
| Byzantine Rhetoric after the Fall of Constantinople .....                             | 140 |
| Rudolphus Agricola .....                                                              | 143 |
| Rhetoric in the Works of Desiderius Erasmus .....                                     | 144 |
| Philipp Melanchthon's Authority of Protestant Rhetoric .....                          | 148 |
| Petrus Ramus and Omer Talon. The Tradition<br>of Philippo-Ramian Rhetoric Books ..... | 150 |
| Francesco Patrizi's <i>Perfetta Rhetorica</i> .....                                   | 155 |

#### **5. BAROQUE RHETORIC IN SERVICE OF THE CHURCH** .....

|                                                                                                        |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Soarez's Jesuit Rhetoric .....                                                                         | 161 |
| Caussin's Figures, Symbols and Emblems .....                                                           | 162 |
| Jesuit Rhetoric in Bohemia and Poland. Bohuslav Balbín .....                                           | 163 |
| Protestant Rhetoric and Preaching Textbooks .....                                                      | 164 |
| Bartholomaeus Keckermann and the Gdańsk Rhetoric .....                                                 | 165 |
| Vossius's Rhetoric of Rhetorical Affects .....                                                         | 166 |
| Comenius's Brethren's Rhetoric .....                                                                   | 167 |
| Religious, Political and Cultural Prerequisites<br>for the Rhetorical Boom in Russia and Ukraine ..... | 172 |

#### **6. SCHOLARLY COMMUNITY REPLACED BY THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS. PHILOSOPHY VERSUS RHETORIC AT THE THRESHHOLD OF A NEW ERA** .....

|                                                |     |
|------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Bacon's Polemical Dialogue with Rhetoric ..... | 178 |
| Hobbes's Rhetoric as a Political Weapon .....  | 181 |
| Bernard Lamy's Cartesian Inspirations .....    | 182 |

#### **7. TASTE NORMS AND CRITERIA IN 18<sup>TH</sup>-CENTURY RHETORIC** .....

|                                                                                       |     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Fénelon's Rhetoric as an Art of Portraiture .....                                     | 187 |
| Du Marsais and His Project of Philosophical Rhetoric .....                            | 188 |
| Vico's <i>Institutiones oratoriae</i> and Project of a "New Science" .....            | 189 |
| Rhetoric, Teaching Refined Taste (Bouhours, Rollin, Dubos) .....                      | 190 |
| Adam Smith and Scottish Rhetoric .....                                                | 192 |
| Rhetoric in Spain and Gregorio Mayans y Siscar .....                                  | 196 |
| Philological Orientation of Rhetoric in Germany –<br>Johann Christoph Gottsched ..... | 198 |
| Lomonosov and the Development of Classicism in Russia .....                           | 200 |

#### **8. RHETORIC IN THE 19<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY** .....

|                                                                                                          |     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Friedrich Nietzsche and the Philosophy of Rhetoric .....                                                 | 206 |
| 19 <sup>th</sup> -Century Rhetoric in France. Fontanier's Semantic Theory<br>of Tropes and Figures ..... | 208 |
| 19 <sup>th</sup> -Century Rhetoric in England. Whately, Bain, Spencer .....                              | 211 |

|                                                                                        |     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Jungmann's <i>Slovesnost</i> as Rhetoric for Readers' Edification and Taste .....      | 213 |
| <b>9. RHETORIC IN THE 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY</b> .....                                | 217 |
| Rhetoric – Inspiration for Language, Literary and Philosophical Discourses ....        | 220 |
| Rhetoric in the United States against Barriers in Communication .....                  | 222 |
| Rhetoric since the Mid-20 <sup>th</sup> Century in Germany and Austria .....           | 227 |
| Theory of Argumentation in the Work of Chaim Perelman<br>and Stephen Toulmin .....     | 229 |
| Rhetoric in the Second Half of the 20 <sup>th</sup> Century in Romance Countries ..... | 231 |
| <b>10. OTHER RHETORICAL THEORIES AND OTHER CULTURES</b> .....                          | 235 |
| <b>EPILOGUE</b> .....                                                                  | 251 |
| <b>NOTES</b> .....                                                                     | 252 |
| <b>SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY</b> .....                                                     | 255 |
| <b>NAME INDEX</b> .....                                                                | 264 |



## INTRODUCTION

### HISTORY OF RHETORIC – A MOTIONLESS HISTORY?

The content of rhetorical formulas, the normal method of their arrangement and the terminology used have not changed substantially for over two and a half thousand years. The path man has taken from the theme of speech to its acoustic and written representation has also remained unchanged. In September 1416, after an intensive search which enlivened their participation in the Council of Constance, Humanists Poggio Bracciolini, Cincio Romano and Bartolomeo Montepulciano discovered the manuscript of the complete version of Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* (Institutes of Oratory) in the Abbey of St. Gall's dark cellar. This manuscript, which was more than thirteen-hundred years old, became for them and their contemporaries not only a source of knowledge about the admired past, but also a highly prestigious source on the norms of contemporary literary language. A similar situation also occurred one hundred years later when Bishop Gerardo Landriani found Cicero's dialogue *De oratore* (On the Orator) among ancient manuscripts in the north-Italian city of Lodi, a text which had until then been known only in an incomplete and distorted version. The discovery was immediately followed by a wave of Ciceronianism, which resulted in numerous commentaries on Cicero as well as in the production of Cicero-inspired handbooks cultivating the language and style of the cultural elite of the time. Umberto Eco, a representative of modern semiotics, attributes an even longer span of norm-setting influence to Aristotle's *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*. Eco cites many theoretical and artistic works along with movements in modern linguistics and literary criticism which are "Aristotelian in their spirit, aims, results, and ambiguities."<sup>1</sup> The listed sources include Poe's *Philosophy of Composition*, Warren and Wellek's *Theory of Literature*, Russian Formalism, the Prague School, New Criticism, the Chicago School and motifs in Joyce's artistic work.

Rhetoric's defiance of change throughout history is not only due to the unexpected appearance of canonical works of Greek and Roman antiquity, representing radically different historical and cultural contexts, however,

what is even more striking is the unchanged format of rhetoric textbooks, which have solidified over centuries. They lack original ideas, repeating the same phrases, examples, anecdotes. In his *La Rhétorique, ou les Règles de l'éloquence* (1730), Balthasar Gilbert, a teacher of rhetoric in Mazarin College at the University of Paris, proudly announces that he is not presenting unproven rules, but that instead he follows the steps of classical authors, such as Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian (*Nous ne promettons donc pas ici des Règles que personne n'ait encore donné: au contraire, nous faisons gloire de ne suivre, en cette matière, que les traces des Anciens*).

The difference between rhetoric textbooks thus generally lies in accentuating different elements of exposition. The sum of these differences, in fact, demonstrates an apparent shift through history. Rhetoric as a practical set of instructions for effective communication is interspersed with the reflections of contemporary philosophers and thinkers focusing on linguistic and literary style, the logic of the line of reasoning, the psychology of persuasion, and the education of future intellectuals, politicians, advocates and officials. Rhetoric teaches us how to compose texts as well as how to understand both contemporary and historical literature, how to understand the norms which determine the process of language stylization. Over the course of its long history, rhetoric has ceased to be merely a language about a language (a metalanguage) of exclusively public speeches delivered in political gatherings or before the court, and has changed into a metalanguage of stages in the development of culture and civilization. It has thus become the key to interpreting texts, works of art, communication activities and to understanding the principles of communication in general.

The very role of the cultural metalanguage, however, is itself subject to change. The strategies essential to rhetoric's art of "composing an effective and appropriate speech or a written work" were applied wherever style as a set method of choosing and organizing means of expression using a particular repertoire (words, colours, shapes, tones) was essential. Some strategies and rules came to existence in the democracies of antiquity and in imperial Rome, others in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, baroque, classical eras and yet others have been brought about in the present time. Giorgio Vasari, an Italian mannerist and arts historian, added that this set of rules also contains licences, intentional exceptions from the rules and deformations.

The process of accepting or rejecting rhetoric textbooks displays considerably greater developmental dynamics than their form and organiza-

tion. Philosophy, science, school and, last but not least, the legal systems which have since the 17<sup>th</sup> century in most European countries gradually replaced direct confrontation between the plaintiff and the defendant with an elaborate system of evidence procedure, have changed their rational and evaluation attitudes towards rhetoric. The identification of 14<sup>th</sup>–16<sup>th</sup>-century humanist principles with rhetoric is simultaneously being replaced by rationalist efforts to free the thinking subject from the hindrances laid in the path of the processes of cognition and communication by the metaphorical languages of rhetoric and rhetorical argumentation open to various conceits. It is these hindrances that Francis Bacon, Baron Verulam, had in mind when he warned against the idols of the marketplace arising from the “intercourse and association of men with each other.” In his introductory narrative to the *Discourse on the Method*, René Descartes denies that rhetoric should have any role in the education of a young man or in the process of arriving at the truth:

“I placed a great value on eloquence, and I was in love with poetry, but I thought that both of them were gifts given to the mind rather than fruits of study. Those who have the most powerful reasoning and who direct their thoughts best in order to make them clear and intelligible can always convince us best of what they are proposing, even if they speak only the language of Lower Brittany [language of uneducated people, JK] and have never learned rhetoric. And those who possess the most pleasant creative talents and who know how to express them with the most adornment and smoothness cannot help being the best poets, even though the art of poetry is unknown to them.”<sup>2</sup> Descartes’ statement is an anticipation of the revolt represented by romanticism in art one hundred years later, a revolt directed against the binding norms of discourse which can be memorized, against the norms which tie down the originality and unique character of an individual and his style.

The relationship between rhetoric and philosophy in particular was subject not only to numerous antagonisms throughout the course of history, but it also experienced transformations in how it was regarded by society. Henri-Irénée Marrou, a French historian focusing on European education, characterized its beginnings in this way: “The study of rhetoric dominant in all western cultures until that time had begun as the core of ancient Greek education and culture. In ancient Greece, the study of ‘philosophy’, represented by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, for all its subsequent fecundity, was a relatively minor element in the total Greek culture, never competitive with

rhetoric either in the number of its practitioners or in its immediate social effects.”<sup>3</sup>

We can find several reasons why, from the first half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, rationalism and enlightenment led, intentionally or subconsciously, first to limiting the influence of rhetoric and later to its almost total demise:

(a) The character of expert and scientific, legal and political speeches changed. Knowledge and conviction were no longer born in arguments, nor were they based in the confrontation of alternative opinions and the ability to convince the counterpart, but instead it was formed as a result of a train of thought, which was based on rational judgement or the analysis of proven empirical facts. The imagery arising from the application of rhetorical rules and the dependence on canonical models gave way to the clarity and sobriety of style. This resulted in the emergence of new stylistic models. Science was characterized by an increasing optimistic belief in the unlimited nature of human cognition.

(b) Rhetoric’s decline can also be attributed to book printing and a general growth in literacy. As the market for books, encyclopaedias and specialized journals grew and as the role of human memory and spoken language in official contact declined, rhetoric began to drown in a sea of printer’s ink.

(c) Originality became newly valued, and came to replace the *imitatio* method, imitating recognized models. Romanticism created a demand for stylistic innovation in fiction based on the innovative rendering of individual experiences. Science, on the other hand, was marked by efforts to form one’s own perception of the world based on empirically collected material or on one’s own logical assessment. At the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century in his *Il Principe* (The Prince), the Renaissance politician Niccolo Machiavelli intentionally digressed from the established rhetorical model of the moralizing “mirrors for rulers” (*speculum regis*) and, with mathematical precision elaborated a strategy for political struggle consistently aiming to achieve a set goal: a *per fas et nefas* victory, a victory by any and every means.

(d) The unity of the international community of learned men fell apart. The role of Latin was replaced by national languages, which gradually developed their own refined and literary forms. An international version of Latin was no longer the ideal of the time, which was instead represented by the distinctiveness of many languages and many cultures. It was also through legislation that national languages gradually took up their place in official public communications. Any attempt to refute this development by constructing artificial languages for international communication failed.

The return to a single language of international communication did not occur until the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when this role was assumed by English.

(c) The birth of historical and comparative linguistics shifted researchers' interest towards the study of the inner laws of language development, primarily in phonetics and grammar. The rise of Indo-European studies and historical-comparative linguistics as a new philological discipline striving to discover the oldest documented or reconstructed stages of the linguistic system caused a revolution in learning about language and its laws. The regard for the functionally differentiated linguistic discourse as the main object of rhetoric began to disappear and an attempt to create an exact description of the language took the place of older, normative approaches. As rhetoric was fundamentally more limited to a set of practical advice and instructions, it ceased to be considered an equal component of philological research and gradually lost its scientific ambitions.

It was philosophers in particular who reacted to this development. John Locke called rhetoric a "powerful instrument of error and deceit," while Kant criticized it for manipulation and rejected it as a tool for critical communication, which was the mission of an independent thinker. Leibnitz and his followers set out the idea of an artificial language, freed from the temptations of rhetorical imagery, polysemy and manipulation.

The above causes, which originated during the Enlightenment, have, however, begun to lose their power since the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and, a movement accelerating at the threshold of the third millennium even to the extent that each has been transforming into its very opposite. In this context, the world marked by postmodern discourse has been witnessing the return of rhetoric. There are several reasons:

(a) Specialized discourse has become "rhetorized": it has been losing its impartiality and objectivity, and reflects an effort to understand the openness and plurality of the world, to express a personal attitude and a personal responsibility for the problem being addressed. Science has been increasingly lending more legitimacy to questions with alternative solutions which are intelligible only within their respective contexts or paradigms. The conviction that scientific knowledge's objectivity is an illusion has been gaining strength. It is remarkable that this view is also held by representatives of natural and physical sciences, not merely by those in social sciences. The role of axiological statements, paradoxes, chance, probability, alternatives and respect for different world views has been growing. There is a new phe-

nomenon: an individual, subjective scientific style which intends not only to describe and analyze, but also to persuade on issues which lack a definitive solution. This style is also often conditioned by the nature of the language, national traditions and culture. In a direct continuation of the paradigms of ancient rhetoric, philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche is the person who formed the modern roots of this pluralist perception of reality.

(b) Thanks to television and numerous new information technologies, public communication at the end of the century rediscovered the role of oral discourse. The primary form of public communication by scientists, politicians, and representatives of the economic and financial spheres is usually spoken; after all, the speed and readiness of the computer and communications technologies have, to a large extent, erased the traditional differences between the written and spoken language. As was the case of the audience at Athen's Agora or the Roman Forum, modern TV viewers can also register every gesture, every tone of voice employed by the people who speak to them, wanting to persuade them, win their support, make the viewers remember them.

(c) Intertextuality has become an important value: both authors and interpreters of artistic or political texts use quotes, paraphrases, intentional and unconscious allusions to other texts. Communication is thus enriched by another type of context awareness: interdiscursivity, in other words, associating texts with established genre or stylistic models, simultaneously in imitation and disruption of traditional means of expression. *Imitatio*, an ancient rhetorical principle, has thus been revived and has become both a communication device and strategy.

(d) Media, particularly television channels, have created a new type of supranational auditorium bringing events, whose consequences may affect the viewers at any moment, closer. As was the case of ancient Latin or Greek, within this community there are also tendencies strengthening the role of languages utilized in international communication; the status of English has been growing stronger in reflection of the world's increasing globalization.

(e) The renaissance of rhetoric has also been supported by the turn towards communication in contemporary linguistics. Language is now more often being studied in pragmatic, social, logical, psychological and philosophical contexts. It was the importance of context that was anticipated by rhetoric's accentuation of mastering the mutually permeating disciplines of the *trivium*.

It is therefore not surprising that the expression “rhetoric,” with its many and often contradictory meanings, has lately been spreading quickly through the languages of science, mass media, and everyday speech. There is a growing and legitimate concern that every person understands and judges this discipline differently. We can hear voices calling for modern rhetoric, in terms of language, ideas and ethics, to be elevated to a more sophisticated form in public speeches and communication in general, but also those that reject rhetoric as a synonym for ballast, bamboozling, insincerity or intentionally false argumentation.

This discrepancy in the perception of rhetoric is partially due to its status in the history of European education. The ability to communicate efficiently was always perceived as an indispensable part of a person’s and citizen’s education, as the necessary first stage of mastering practical and theoretical knowledge, as part of an active as well as contemplative life. However, rhetoric as a school discipline often succumbed to routine and pedantry. These increased particularly in periods in which freedom of speech as an inseparable attribute of democracy and a precondition of a statesman’s activity and a citizen’s involvement had to give way to the rigid ceremoniousness of speeches strengthening the idea of the unchangeability of the social order.

The contemporary renaissance of rhetoric as a discipline whose content and terminology have been preserved without major change for over two and a half thousand years seems surprising. This is principally attributable to the fact that it has been inspired not only by the effort to better understand the history of human communication, but also by the content of the disciplines which are predominantly related to the modern development of society, such as the theory of communication, media studies, marketing, persuasive strategies, advertising, argumentation theory, speech act analysis and others.

We have mentioned the causes for this renaissance, which can also be seen in the rapidly growing bibliography of the discipline. We should add the topicality of the issue and the historically preconditioned transformation of rhetoric’s central theme: speech, *oratio*. Not only speech as the generally understood result of the human ability to communicate and achieve understanding, but also as a reflection of particular conditions which determine the quality and efficiency of an utterance as to its content and function, and further with respect to the situation in which a communication act is taking place. In accordance with the content of the fundamental summarizing work of ancient rhetorical culture, Quintilian’s *Institutio oratoria*, these

conditions also include the personality of the orator (his knowledge, experience, talent, psyche, moral qualities), the nature of the audience, the system of language and argumentation means the speaker has at his disposal and, last but not least, functional and thematic differences between individual types of speech, be they to inform (*docere*) or amuse (*delectare*) the listener and thus inspire an action or a particular stance (*movere*).

Ancient society perceived rhetoric primarily as an art (*technē* in Greek, *ars* in Latin) which taught, according to a systematic set of rules or based on an imitation of classical models (*mimēsis*, *imitatio*), everyone, even those who were not endowed with a natural talent for speech-making, to be successful in expressing their opinions in a given situation, whether at an advisory assembly, in court or on other occasions. The dominant position of rhetoric in the education of a citizen as a fundamental part of ancient cultural heritage, however, also places the system of rhetorical knowledge not only among practical skills, but also among scientific disciplines. From its very outset, rhetoric acted as *technē*, experience acquired through practice, and *empeiria*, routine, but also as an important element in the effort to learn about and explain reality as *epistēmē*, *scientia*. That ranked it, along with grammar and logic (dialectics), among the necessary preconditions for the study of philosophy and, later, theology. Quintilian characterized rhetoric as *bene dicendi scientia* (further specifying *ad persuadendum accommodare dicere*), that is, as a purpose “to speak in order to persuade.” The word *bene*, meaning “well,” expresses a relatively free choice of stylistic means, compared to grammar, where the adverb *recte*, “correctly,” in the definition *recte dicendi scientia*, clearly aims at the criterion of language correctness: without stylistic and rhetorical licenses. Unlike other scientific disciplines, rhetoric was closer to the sphere of practical activities; it did not only focus on a didactically oriented description and explanation of its main components: language correctness, style, methods of logical argumentation, psychology of the speaker and listeners, etc., but also on contemplation and practical instruction. These were related to many things, including the method of teaching rhetorical skills, the ethics of persuasion, cultivating political and judicial practice.

An effort to explain what rhetoric in fact includes, what is the scope of its knowledge and what is its purpose within the former system of basic liberal arts (trivium), does not always lead to univocal results. This is primarily due to the changeability of rhetoric in periods of social development, from its outset in the ancient *polis* to the present day. In antiquity, in the medieval

educational system and, with even more intensity, in the spiritual life of the European Renaissance, rhetoric was a central element in the education of a young man and future intellectual, it assumed a prominent position in the theory and practice of preaching and also served as a key to interpreting biblical texts and fiction. It was Cartesian philosophy and, in the arts, the romantics' revolt against the binding norms of the style of the time that brought about its decline and later its almost complete demise.

There are several other reasons why it is difficult to define the content and meaning of rhetoric more precisely. Their source must be sought in the controversies surrounding the ethical qualification, and often also disqualification, of the discipline which, rather than striving for truthfulness, focused on the probable and trustworthy in the communicated matter, on the orator's artistry in being able to take advantage of the immediate situation to persuade listeners and influence their opinion. In the sense of Plato's interpretation of sophism, expressed primarily in *Gorgias*, rhetoric is understood as *peithous demiurgos*, the creator and confirmer of the conviction, and its main role is *psychagogia tis dia logōn*, the ability to lead (but also mislead) human souls by means of words. This is also a source of conflict between philosophy and rhetoric, the conflict that Plato raised throughout his oeuvre. The more philosophy focused on metaphysical questions and eternal and unchangeable certainties, the more dramatic the controversy between philosophy and rhetoric became. The paradox of the ethical dilemma of rhetoric lies in the fact that the vast majority of authors of books on rhetoric and rhetoric textbooks repeatedly emphasized the fact that an orator cannot survive without reliable knowledge of the matter he was to talk about. Philosophical, dialectical knowledge and high ethical standards thus appear to be necessary preconditions for producing an effective speech. On the other hand, even philosophers were aware of the fact that without attention to their own language and their manner of speaking, in other words to rhetoric, they could not effectively convey the results of their learning. Thus, among philosophers we can find both opponents of rhetoric, such as Plato, Descartes, Locke and Kant, as well as thinkers willing to admit it was a useful or neutral tool for communication, such as Aristotle, Vico, Nietzsche, Ricoeur, Gadamer, Bělohradský. After a firm rejection of rhetoric as a dangerous weapon of sophist persuasion, Plato himself was willing to admit, in *Phaedrus*, to the possibility of real rhetoric, of philosophers' rhetoric which would talk to a human soul through clear and perfect expositions on the just, the beautiful and the good; these expositions should,

according to Plato, be based directly on the orator's responsibility for his words and acts.

An ethical dilemma also arose in the relation between rhetoric and theology. Many Church Fathers, educated in the spirit of classical Greek and Latin learning, painfully, even existentially, realized that this education and culture was pagan and hostile. In this lies the dichotomy between their proclamations against rhetoric and the need, which they plainly acknowledged, to use this knowledge in a preacher's practice and for exegetical exposition. This need was often accompanied by an admiration for both beloved classical authors and for the power and appeal of their words. The controversy over whether or not the Bible, and the New Testament in particular, should be included in the list of the canonical classical writers recognized as either rhetorical or linguistic and stylistic models, affected most Christian authors in the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> centuries. This controversial approach is particularly symptomatic of St. Augustin, his contemporaries and close followers, but it also appears much later. Even Comenius in his text *A Report and Lesson on Preaching*, whose content and organization reveal consistent knowledge of ancient models, outwardly turns away from rhetoric: "And so that who wants to speak from God's place shall not use his own, or Cicero's, or some courtly words, but words of the Holy Spirit."<sup>4</sup>

When speaking about the connections between rhetoric and ethics, we must not neglect rhetoric's role in achieving social consensus. This role had a necessary precondition: the freedom of speech granting every citizen the right to participate in public life and defend himself in court. Ancient rhetoric is rooted in Athenian democracy and in the political and judicial practice of republican Rome. Consul Crassus, the main orator in Cicero's dialogue *De oratore* says: "nothing seems to me a nobler ambition than to be able to hold by your eloquence the minds of men, to captivate their wills, to move them to and fro in whatever direction you please. This art of all others has ever found its fullest development in every free community, and more especially in states enjoying peace and tranquillity, and has ever exercised a dominant influence" (I.8). Any suppression of the freedom of speech led either to the end of rhetoric or to its transformation into a set of instructions, into superficial speech mannerism without much content.

In our effort to define rhetoric in this opening chapter, we naturally cannot avoid a search for a satisfactory reply to the highly topical question of whether the subjects of this discipline are orally delivered speeches exclusively or whether its rules apply across the entire range of persuasive com-

munication, spoken and written, or even discourses carried out exclusively in writing, such as diplomatic correspondence, historical documents, genres of an artistic nature and others. The study of circumstances which led to the birth of rhetoric as well as the study of the oldest classical texts leads us to the conclusion that the beginnings of rhetoric are associated with the era of Homer's Greece, with its exclusively oral culture, but that it soon also included the written word. When linking Athenian rhetoric with the practical activities of logographers, people who would compose speeches for their clients (or even wrote them out entirely) and then helped them to memorize the speech and practice its delivery, there is no reason to think that rhetoric would focus solely on spoken language.

This development is to a much larger extent linked with how Hellenistic authors of rhetoric examined not only the advisory, judicial and celebratory discourses, which were primarily shaped to be delivered orally, but also the artistic, epistolary, historiographic, philosophical and scientific ones. The gradual transition from the typically spoken, paratactically arranged sentence units, which were easier to remember, to a more demanding syntactic structure which reveals the possible existence of a primary written model is evident in the linguistic means. The study of ancient and later sources reveals that many speeches by famous orators of Greek antiquity which have been preserved in written form were never publicly delivered and thus were intentionally created to be works of literature. Isocrates's *Panathenaicus* was said to have taken three years to write, while the completion of his *Panegyricus*, which was famous for its subtle argumentation and the elaborate rhythmic structure of the text, allegedly took ten years. However, records of preserved speeches must be generally understood as the outcome of later editing, either carried out by the author himself or someone else. Stenographic records of public speeches are somewhat more authentic. The history of shorthand mentions, for example, Marcus Tullius Tiro, Cicero's secretary, known for "Tironian notes." Even in this case, the original text was linguistically adjusted and these adjustments affected both the factual content and the stylistic effect of the speech.

Rhetoric became particularly closely connected with written texts at the peak of the Middle Ages, when it was called *ars dictaminis* and when private as well as official (diplomatic, in particular) correspondence was its subject. *Ars dictaminis* or the art of letter writing (from the Latin verb *dictare*, which means not only to dictate, but also to write and produce literary texts, cf. *dichten* in German) emerged in Italy (in Bologna and Monte Cassino) in the

12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> centuries and became an essential part of instruction for church diplomats and the newly emerging city patriciate. The art of letter writing was also promoted by the Italian-born founder of the rhetorical tradition in the Czech Lands, Henricus of Isernia, at the end of the 13<sup>th</sup> century.

Our contemplations on rhetoric thus lead, in accord with the extant development which started in antiquity, to the gradually wider understanding of the discipline, whose demands accompany a learned person throughout his or her life and runs the full gamut of communication requirements. What we have left to think about is whether rhetoric focused exclusively on monologues (spoken or written) or whether it also included everyday dialogues. The suggestion to an answer can be found in Cicero's *De oratore*, in which one of the figures says: "[...] not to be always thinking of the forum, its courts of justice, public meetings, and senate, what greater enjoyment can there be in times of leisure, what greater intellectual treat than the brilliant discourse of a perfect scholar?" (I.8). Clearly, Cicero and many of his followers also cared for the cultivation of everyday language: *sermo*, conversation, which they distinguished from a speech intended for a wider public, and *contentio*, argument.

We may thus assume that in antiquity and in later authors, there was something that could be called *rhetorica sermonis*. Rhetoric textbooks which systematically adhere to the classical structure demonstrate that this indeed is the case. The unknown author of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (Rhetoric for Herennius) ascribes four properties to *sermo*: dignity (*dignitas*), clear explanation (*demonstratio*), ability to narrate (*narratio*) and facetiousness (*iocatio*). From the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, these very qualities were included in the education of noble ladies, who organized and cultivated conversation in the newly emerging salons. Generally speaking, with the exception of these rather general recommendations, the theme of private conversation defied systematic rhetorical codification in its very essence. According to Cicero, these conversations do not constitute the subject matter of rhetoric, but rather of ethics and an effort to achieve spiritual harmony and friendship between people. Speech (in the sense of *sermo*) is a natural ability, which distinguishes humans from animals, while cultivated speech, eloquence (*eloquentia*) is an extension of this, the result of systematic education and long-term cultivation. The personal character of private conversations did not exclude highly demanding themes, because after all dialogue, albeit naturally in the form of artistically treated fiction, has always been an important genre of artistic, philosophical, theological and scientific literature.

If ancient and, later, Renaissance authors ever paid attention to dialogical situations, rather than their language features, they praised the relaxed atmosphere and friendly spirit, which should prevail, the desire to explain mutual contradictions (to achieve harmony in dissonance), or the willingness to accompany the conversation with a glass of wine, good food and the joy of the surrounding beautiful countryside or architecture. This is suggested by the names of dialogic genres: *convivium*, *colloquium (inter nos)*, *disputationes matutinae*, in Greek: *symposion*, *deipnon* (feast). Thus systematic expositions in rhetoric textbooks utilized the language of dialogues (*sermocinatio* in Latin) to adopt only those fixed tropes and figures of speech which give the impression that the orator is the listeners' equal, that he converses with them.

The classification of liberal arts (*artes liberales*) understood by ancient authors to be man's intellectual creative activities pursued in his free time determines rhetoric's status. In its essence, this discipline, along with acting, dance, singing, recitation, sports achievements, is one of practical arts (*technai praktikai*, *artes in agendo positae*), based on performing a particular activity (*actio*). In rhetoric, this activity is demonstrated through delivery, whose effect is based on the acoustic properties of speech, gestures and facial expressions. Efforts to preserve the delivered speech, and many authors even wrote texts without requiring they be delivered orally (Isocrates, Lysias), included rhetoric among the arts targeting a material product (*technai poiētikai*, *artes in effectu positae*). This product was a piece of work, *opus*, created by an author, *artifex*, complying with certain rules, *praecepta*. Unlike practical arts, in which the spectator or listener, *spectator* or *auditor*, encounters a narrative, which is only preserved in his memory, the reader of poetry, along with the observer of sculptures, paintings and buildings, can return to these works because they are always available to him. Finally, rhetoric also belongs among the theoretical arts (*technai theōretikai*, *artes in inspectione rerum positae*), which are based on observing and evaluating things. It focuses neither on the *actor*, the orator, actor, athlete, nor on the *artifex*, the poet, painter, sculptor, composer, as was the case in the previous categories, but rather on the reader and listener (*theōros*), who may be a lay observer, but also a critic or qualified researcher. The almost two-and-a-half-thousand-year development of rhetoric is thus marked by the alternating accentuation of its affiliation with the first, second or third category of human skills.

The history of rhetoric is, in fact, a history of the culture of a public discourse. This also means that the contemplations of the first generation authors of books on rhetoric with striking accuracy anticipated the content

of disciplines whose paradigms were formed much later. Ancient rhetoric gave rise, directly or indirectly, to linguistic and literary stylistics, biblical exegesis and hermeneutics, the semiotics and the science of language communication, speech act theory and pragmatics, linguistics and text theory, the knowledge which was attained by sociolinguistics, media studies, ethno-linguistics and psycholinguistics. Rhetoric is distinguished from these disciplines by a clear normative character, an effort to improve communication and achieve efficient and aesthetically perfect speech. A perfect orator, *perfectus orator*, is rhetoric's ideal. When following the history of this discipline, we learn more about him and his intention than about the very speech and orator's practice and about the paths along which it developed. However, even the transformations of this ideal are based on experience and demonstrate how deeply human speech is anchored in the reality that surrounds us.

The title of this book, *Rhetoric in European Culture and Beyond*, begs two more reflections, whose content I will here only present in brief.

The first is based in the answer to the question of whether rhetoric was born exclusively from European antiquity or whether we should also talk about rhetorical traditions outside Europe, sprouting from different sources. If we understand rhetoric as a reflection of a language in its persuasive role, which is historically contingent and which arose from a particular cultural context, then it is truly a heritage of antiquity, which, however, overflowed Europe's borders on many occasions. We should remember, at the very least, Arabic commentators on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the remarkable extent of Jesuit education based on rhetoric, which imbued areas from South America to Portuguese Goa, as well as the revival of interest in rhetoric at the end of the first third of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, which was primarily based on works by North-American literary scientists and philosophers, as well as on the examination of poetic and rhetorical language in the school of the Russian Formalists. However, if we identify the importance attached to the notion of rhetoric with speech practice, or more precisely with the prevalent conventions and rules of the narrative and persuasive discourse, then metonymical phrases, including Indian rhetoric, Arabic rhetoric, Chinese rhetoric, Japanese rhetoric, and Native American rhetoric, with their many differences due to ethnicity, culture and system of logical thinking, seem justified and can be supported by an extensive bibliography. The last chapter in this book is devoted to this issue.

The second reflection is associated with the topicality of rhetoric as a discipline, which for long centuries united European culture, thus aiding in the

formation of an international community of learned men. The key to participation in this community in Europe for many centuries was principally the knowledge of Latin. However, even after this was gradually replaced by national languages, rhetoric did not cease to fulfil its integrationist role. Before this, it had instilled order in individual genres, stylistic and composition techniques, had passed on the traditional *loci communes*.<sup>5</sup> Along with this, it also formed an educational system which enabled students to effortlessly change schools and universities, thus strengthening their awareness of an integrated community of intellectuals.

Rhetoric in itself has not only been the result of integration tendencies in European thinking and communication, but also greatly contributed to their formation. It was based in the four main pillars of European thought – the Greek love for wisdom, the Roman belief in justice, embodied by the system of Roman law, the Judeo-Christian notion of religious belief and the Renaissance trust in man and in the power of his creative skills. In this sense, rhetoric, open to future development, never ceased to serve as the key-stone to the arch of European education and culture, which continues to rest on these pillars.

## 1. THE ORIGIN OF RHETORIC IN ANCIENT GREECE

### THE SEARCH FOR TECHNÉ

The capacity to use the power of words to tell a story and to persuade others was highly respected throughout antiquity, the foundation of European education. Although the spread of the word and concept of *rhētorikē*, rhetoric, was associated with Plato's dialogues, rhetorical skills were esteemed as early as the Homeric period of Greek history. In Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, the *rhētēr*, rhetor, also sometimes called the *rhétēr mythōn*, the narrator of ancient stories, was a highly regarded authority, who could, like the sage Nestor, speak in public, give advice, captivate, win general consent and admiration. This is also related to the words *rhēsis*, *rhētra*, speaking, narration, utterance, speech discourse, and *rhētos* which refers to what has been said, uttered, or named. Rhetoric was the art of mastering the word, *logos*, as well as a discipline which rationally reflected on the different uses of the logos, captured its laws and attempted to codify them through an arranged set of rules.

Documents regarding life in ancient Greece and the earliest references to political and judicial speeches make manifest that the rise of rhetoric as a discipline focusing on *technē*, persuasive speech making, is many decades older. It is particularly Thucydides's *History of The Peloponnesian War* which demonstrates that ancient politicians and military leaders made speeches. This is undoubtedly true of Pericles's speech over the fallen (*epitafios logos*) during the war's first year. The authenticity of the preserved extract is, however, questionable and it was likely the subject matter of later stylization. Speeches by politicians and leaders, which very likely lacked written preparation, were thus preserved only in paraphrase. In *Phaedrus*, Plato uses the character of Phaedrus to claim that: "...the greatest and most influential statesmen are ashamed of writing speeches and leaving them in a written form, lest they should be called Sophists by posterity" (Plat. *Phaedrus* 235). On the other hand, speeches delivered in court were preserved in many collections and their authorship ascribed to famous logographers. These

speeches, often recognized as practical models for further speech making, were preserved in libraries and even traded. Oldest among the canon of ancient orators was Antiphon of Ramnos (ca. 480–411 BCE), a supporter of the oligarchic Four Hundred government, which was later overthrown. His works were compiled by Caecilius of Calacte at the beginning of the modern era. Three of his court speeches concerning murders, along with 15 speeches written for other occasions, have been preserved in full and another 60 are known of either from fragments or by name. Antiphon was also possibly the first orator who preserved his court speeches in writing and sold them for money, as was ironically noted in Aristophanes's comedy *The Wasps* (422 BCE).

From the outset, however, rhetoric did not include all speech functions, and instead primarily focused on those aiming to influence the audience at a particular moment and through particular circumstances surrounding the speech. It was the orator's task to take advantage of anything that could help persuade the audience in the given situation. The earliest teachers of rhetoric did not merely formulate the principles of an effective speech, but also persuaded the audience that these principles could be learnt at school. The Czech philosopher Jan Patočka characterized the dissemination of ancient rhetoric in the following manner: "Educating people to enable them to engage in political life, to provide them with an instrument for success in this life primarily meant teaching them rhetorical skills, teaching them the power of speech."<sup>6</sup>

Since its outset, rhetoric has been based on two fundamental prerequisites: freedom of speech, *parrēsia*, and freedom to act, which allowed the audience to lean towards the most persuasive of the possible behavioural variants, towards the best of presented arguments, without being forced to take a particular stance. Rhetoric thus does not concern the domain of irrefutable knowledge, *apodeixis*, or threats and verbal violence, instead it focuses on the area of opinion, *doxa*. Stoic philosopher Zeno of Citium illustrated the difference between dialectic, whose realm consists of irrefutable propositions, and rhetoric, which seeks what appears probable (*eikos*), by comparing the symbol of a firmly closed fist (a succession of logical proofs) with the symbol of an open hand (the strategic arrangement of rhetorical arguments). The etymology of the Greek words *peithein*, to persuade, and *pistis*, persuasion, are close in meaning to the Latin word *fides*, faith, clearly expressing the extent of freedom and personal involvement which distinguishes the subject matter of rhetoric from what a man perceives as

necessary and thus immutable. The etymology of the Latin verb *persuadere*, to persuade, provides yet another perspective on the essence of rhetoric: the assumed Indo-European basis *svadūs*, sweet, pleasing (corresponding to the Slavic root *sladk-*, English *sweet* or German *süss*), evokes an activity related to delight and intoxicating illusion, something rhetoric has been reproached for since Plato's time.

The prestige of an appropriately delivered speech and, to the same degree, an awareness of the effects of words, cultivated by reciting rhapsodies and ancient drama, these are the foundations from which rhetoric sprouted in the 5<sup>th</sup> century. Impulses for its formation arose from two significant political transformations within Greek society: from Ephialtes's justice reform and Cleisthenes's democratic constitution, which enacted a new system of city administration. Both changes caused an unprecedented surge in civic activities fundamentally connected with increased demands for political and judicial oratory.

These demands became manifest most notably in judicial practice. In 462 BCE, Ephialtes, the leader of the democratic party in Athens, introduced the institution of jury and appellate courts, *hēliaia*, which replaced the judicial power of the traditional aristocratic council, *areopagus*. After the establishment of *hēliaia*, the traditional aristocratic council which was made up of life-members, *archons*, it was assigned the duty of making decisions concerning capital crimes. The *hēliaia* had 6,000 drawn jurors (*hēlistai*) who made decisions in councils (*discateria*), with the number of jurors for individual hearings ranging from 201 to 1501. They did not have any specialized judicial education and could only be informed about the case from the speeches delivered by the prosecution and defence. The jurors had to swear that they would be impartial (*homoios*) and that they would not allow personal relationships or animosities to affect their judgement. The prosecutor and defendant were not only to provide a convincing description of the case, but also to apply and interpret any pertinent laws. In each lawsuit, views and opinions were to be presented by the individual and nobody was allowed representation. The only help to be used was that of a paid expert, *logographer*, who wrote the speech and rehearsed its delivery with the client.

This was the origin of the oldest types of court speeches (*dikanikon genos*): accusation (*katēgoria*) and defence (*apologia*). As Aristotle states (Rhet. 1359b), they concern actions that have or have not occurred in the past and it is the role of the *hēliastic* court to judge these actions from a legal

perspective as just (*dikaion*) or unjust (*adikon*). This genre may be exemplified in the literary form represented in both *Apologies of Socrates* (*Sōkratous apologia*) by Plato and Xenophon, and the Sophist Polycrates's *Prosecution of Socrates* (*Sōkratous katēgoria*).

The most typical expression of Athenian democracy was advisory political oratory (*to symbuleutikon genos*). In his stylistics textbook, Dionysius of Halicarnassus defines rhetoric as *dynamis technikē pithanou logou en pragmati politiko telos echousa to eu legein* (an artistic faculty of persuasive discourse in political matters, having the goal of speaking well). Political rhetoric in Athens was used at assemblies (*ekklēsia*), in which all citizens of good character participated at least forty times a year. The themes of such political speeches concerned the future, and it was the assembled citizens' task to judge their content with respect to what appeared beneficial (*ōfelimon*) or harmful (*anofelēs*) to the community. Demosthenes' *Speech Against Philip the Macedon* is a clear representation of the harsh polemic genre of political speeches.

The above-mentioned genres, which R. Volkmann, the author of a synthetic history of ancient rhetoric (1895), calls *pragmatikon*, are contrasted with the epideictic oratory (*to epideiktikon genos*), that is, celebratory and defamatory speeches. They are characterized by their level of literacy, a focus on the aesthetic value of the speech and occasionally even a certain playfulness and jocularly related to the topic, often strikingly trivial or employing unusual linguistic or stylistic means as an intentionally stylized counterpoint to the seriousness of the speech. There are two types of epideictic speeches: praise (*epainos*) and denigration (*psogos*). They focus on what the orator considers beautiful (*kalon*) or ugly and ripe for condemnation (*aischron*). The epideictic genre included *panegyrik*, the praise of public figures, institutions and community virtues, *enkomion*, those more intimate praises usually delivered during feasts, *epithalamion*, speeches given at weddings, *genethliakon*, a speech delivered to mark a birthday, and *epitafios logos*, a funeral oration. Many of these were designed primarily to win favour, to promote (*protreptikon logos*, from the Greek work *protrepō*, to urge, win someone for something) and it was their task to entice a liking for various people, sciences, arts, philosophical views and other matters.

It was this epideictic genre that gave rise to the association, which has been raised and condemned so frequently over the course of history, of rhetoric with verbal magic, the irrationality of affecting through speech and creating illusions. In *The Republic*, Plato claims that the desire to create