


IMPLICATING ENVIRONMENTS



Stephen Hardy

MASARYK
UNIVERSITY
PRESS

IMPLICATING ENVIRONMENTS

MUNI
PRESS

IMPLICATING ENVIRONMENTS



THE EARLIER WORK OF
PAUL CARTER & J.H. PRYNNE
IN THE CONTEXT OF
RELATED ASPECTS OF
LATER MODERN NEO-PASTORAL

Stephen Hardy

MASARYK UNIVERSITY PRESS

Brno 2021

Implicating Environments: The Earlier Work of Paul Carter and J.H. Prynne in the Context of Related Aspects of Later Modern Neo-Pastoral, by Stephen Hardy

First Masaryk University Press edition, May 2021

This edition © 2021 by Masaryk University Press

All rights reserved. The use of any part of this publication reproduced, transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, or stored in a retrieval system, without prior written consent of the publisher or the authors constitutes an infringement of the copyright law.

Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Hardy, Stephen

Implicating Environments: The Earlier Work of Paul Carter and J.H. Prynne in the Context of Related Aspects of Later Modern Neo-Pastoral / by Stephen Hardy. — 1st Masaryk University Press ed.

p. cm. — (Masaryk University Press)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN-13: 978-80-210-9734-6

1. Modernist Poetry — English. 2. Cultural Geography — English. 3. Literary Aesthetics — English. 4. Political Philosophy. 5. English Literature.

I. Title. II. Hardy, Stephen. III. Prynne, J.H. IV. Carter, Paul. V. Olson, Charles. VI. Bowie, Andrew. VII. Deleuze, Gilles.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5817/CZ.MUNI.M210-9735-2021>

This volume was made possible partly through the grant “Paradigms, Strategies and Developments — Anglophone Literary and Cultural Studies,” funded by Masaryk University (Grant MUNI/A/1446/2020).

This volume was reviewed for publication by Arthur Redding, Professor of English at York University, Toronto, Ontario, and Pavel Drábek, Professor of English at the University of Hull.

Cover: *Samuel Palmer's Nature*, a collage by Matt Kaylor (Brno, 2020)

Published by Masaryk University Press

Žerotínovo nám. 617/9, 601 77 Brno, Czech Republic

<http://www.muni.cz/press>

ISBN 978-80-210-9734-6 (print); ISBN 978-80-210-9735-3 (online ; pdf)

Contents

Chapter I: Introductory	1
Chapter II: Charles Olson, Edward Dorn, David Jones	89
Chapter III: J.H. Prynne: from 'Resistance and Difficulty' (1961) to <i>Kitchen Poems</i> (1968)	153
Chapter IV: J.H. Prynne (2): from <i>Day Light Songs</i> (1968) and <i>Into the Day</i> (1972) to <i>The Oval Window</i> (1983)	253
Chapter V: J.H. Prynne (3): <i>From Bands Around the Throat</i> (1987) to <i>Red D Gypsum</i> (1997)	463
Chapter VI: Paul Carter: <i>The Road to Botany Bay</i> (1987) and <i>The Lie of the Land</i> (1996)	527

Dedicated
to my Father and Mother,
Harry & Joan Hardy

and to
the town and all the people of Oldham,
living and dead

Chapter One: Introductory

IN this age, if they read any, many people and many publishers, even of the academic variety, tend to like their books short, as do some, though by no means all, writers, of various types, sometimes with good reasons, sometimes with less admirable ones. This book is long, not because it is the product of a lifetime's work, or because it is an extensively researched scholarly work but because it is what it is, from the perspective of its writer and, differently, from that of any possible reader. In the climate and context in which it was written, the present study, as I shall tend to refer to it, has been consciously conceived of as a long, unapologetically rambling, discursive walk, consisting of a series of 'tours', or trackings, through the work of a number of later twentieth century authors and essentially, on my part, as a somewhat lengthier development of earlier preoccupations,¹ one which primarily concerns itself with analysis and discussion of aspects of the work of two writers, the British poet J.H. Prynne and the British-born, Australia-based, cultural and spatial historian Paul Carter.

With respect to both writers, the study provided is essentially introductory, rather than reflectively analytical and focuses upon 'following' or, as indicated in my opening paragraph, 'tracking', a certain initial thread of what can still be termed 'interpretation', if as we shall partly see later, this conceptualisation is itself constantly increasing in terms of its parameters of complexity and implication. The study as a whole concerns itself, if to a less substantial extent, with elements of the work of the poets Charles Olson, Edward Dorn, and David Jones, as well as, in this opening chapter, with a series of perspectives provided by a number of representative practitioners working in fields considered pertinent to those regarded as being under discussion, primarily in terms of environments, politics, ethics, aesthetics, and literature and classifiable, at least from a certain perspective, as pertaining to the notion of 'pastoral', a term subsequently to be explored in more detail.

The primary title of the study is loosely (as in the active rather than passive form of 'implicate') intended to intimate, among other things, a certain sense of the melancholy aspect of the spirit of T.W. Adorno haunting its pages, although by no means in primary or predominantly, or even very perceptibly, pessimistic fashion. A large proportion of human beings still live, probably always have lived, and for a long time will, almost equally probably, continue to live, in one part of the planet or another, one section of society or another – in considerably demanding, to the point of desperate, practical and existential circumstances. The role of pastoral in this respect is as much cautionary as it is idealistic.

It is partly with regard to this observation that the environments posited in the discussion which follows are not only those of the traditionally 'natural' variety upon which the still relatively emergent sub-discipline of literary eco-criticism has recently focused, but rather the wider range of intimately related, more often than not predominantly human, environments which are implicated in their 'natural' counterparts and

¹ See Stephen Hardy, *Relations of Place: Aspects of Late 20th Century Fiction and Theory* (Brno: Masaryk University, Opera Universitatis Masarykianae Brunensis Facultas Philosophica: Spisy Masarykovy University v Brne, Filozofika Fakulta, c.376, 2008).

in which, as we have become increasingly aware, such natural environments have themselves become increasingly implicated, as those of us who are in a position to view ourselves entering into the epoch of the Anthropocene in what are, at the time of the writing of this study, very rapidly developing technical environments.

What might be regarded as the increasingly baffling, dangerous, sometimes positive and intriguing, as well as, again, complex, nature of these mutually implicating environments is not addressed in this book with any specifically qualified degree of expertise or breadth of range, other than a literary appreciation of the work of those writers primarily discussed. At the same time, the study seeks, in the context of more precise forms of literary analysis, to impart a sense of the way in which aspects of human learning, ingenuity and creativity, as exemplified, above all, in the work of systems-theory sociologists such as, and primarily, Niklas Luhmann, derive considerable inspiration from the work of the natural sciences, despite their partial critique of aspects of those same sciences' perspectives and effects.

In like fashion, the closely related but also specifically literary and environmentally focused perspective provided by Andrew McMurry, in addition to the environmentally-oriented cultural philosophy of Arran Gare, are also referenced here in introductory relation to what are, in many respects, the closely related concerns and approaches of the central focus of this book, the poetry of J.H. Prynne produced between 1968 and 1997. This work is itself considered in close proximity both to the aspects of that of the three poets regarded, in this context, as anticipating certain, significant aspects of Prynne's approach, just as the final cultural initiative to be considered here, the earlier work of Paul Carter, is regarded both as recognising the importance of certain elements of Prynne's multi-perspectival poetic and as complementing and developing those elements in specific respects.

Despite and because of the faint allusion to Adorno as initial pessimist but ultimate optimist, the aims of the analysis and commentary subsequently provided here are most intimately and ultimately related to questions of joy and the love of life, rather than to those tendencies which serve, on what often seems to be a depressingly consistent and overwhelming basis, to deprive many of us of both. In this respect, a substantial amount of this opening chapter is devoted to elements of the post-war philosophical reception of aspects of the ethics and politics of the radical seventeenth-century European, Portuguese-Dutch, metaphysical and political philosopher, Baruch Spinoza, a thinker reputed to keep a copy of the Bible next to that of the Koran on his bookshelves and like Erasmus, though perhaps to an even greater degree, a believer in and promoter of religious toleration in an age when many considered such an aptitude or attitude to be tantamount to the encouragement of a state of anarchy barely contained in many parts of Europe in the middle part of the seventeenth century.

In spite of what might be seen as the disturbingly comparable form of troubled times in which we live at present, the aim of human life and, in relation to it, the aim of literature, philosophy, and much else besides, will essentially be viewed in this study from what is understood as an essentially Spinozian perspective (or, in related terms, a perspective on Spinoza) in terms of its potential for enjoyment, albeit in the face of immense misery and sadness in the world; that is to say, not so in terms of self-enjoyment – the hedonistically-oriented carrot complementing the stick as provided by those forms of socio-economic relations engendered by what might be regarded as the currently dominant forms of capitalism – but, as far as is possible, the actively open and as other-oriented as self-oriented enjoyment of as much of the rest of the world on which

each pertinent self or being, human or otherwise (but with an inevitably primary emphasis on the human – a non-anthropocentric human perspective on the world will be regarded as a contradiction in terms, an arguably non-Luhmannian perspective on a still significant form of self-observational paradox), is dependent, of which that self or being is composed, and with which it has much, though by no means everything, in common.

Closely related to this notion of en-joyment are, again, strongly Spinoza-informed, notions of knowledge, understanding, feelings, and in this latter respect, not least, as already intimated, fellow-feeling, as well as the endless problems presented to anyone or anything finding themselves following their path in life. At the same time, these will be complemented by aspects of one of the more recent developments in eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophy, that of modern aesthetics, with elements of Andrew Bowie's work on the development and implications of the retrospectively deeply flawed but still inspirational developments in modern, nineteenth and twentieth century German aesthetic philosophy serving as primary guide in this respect, but with a preliminary, prefatory perspective provided by Anthony Cascardi's reading of some of the political implications of Kant's *Critique of Judgement* for our own times.

As with Kant, to an even greater extent, the consideration of Spinoza's philosophy provided in this chapter will be limited to a small, very specific, fraction of the reception of his work mainly derived from two readings, one Italian-Marxist, one French 'post-structuralist', produced between the later 1960s and early 1980s. Spinoza, like many of the philosophers of his own time, but also those of a certain attitude writing in earlier ages, notably that of the Epicureans, was particularly fascinated by the implications for ethics and politics to be derived from the various and more precise forms of observation derived from the discoveries of contemporary sciences, particularly in their use of the optical technologies of the telescope and microscope, and in his case in terms of the conclusions to be drawn in terms of the composition of, and relations between, various forms of body.

A comparable philosophical preoccupation, it can be argued, has steadily developed since that time and has been evidenced in the post-War era by initiatives such as Niklas Luhmann's specific form of systems theory, itself strongly informed by those theories of biochemical autopoiesis as notably posited and investigated in the work of the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francesco Varela, classically, in *Autopoietic Systems: The Realization of the Living*,¹ although also by a great many other researchers in the field, to some of whose work brief attention will be paid, in a limited study of this kind more specifically concerned with developments in literature, notably in the section on the Australian cultural philosopher Arran Gare's approach to the metaphysics and politics of potentially effective forms of environmentalism.²

¹ Humberto Maturana & Francesco Varela, *Autopoietic Systems: The Realization of the Living* (Dordrecht, Holland: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science [Robert S. Cohen & W. Wartofsky Marx, eds.], Vol. XLII. D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1980). Arran E. Gare, *Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis* (London: Routledge, 1995).

² Arran E. Gare, *Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis* (London: Routledge, 1995). Attention should perhaps also be drawn at this point to at least two of Gare's more recent publications, by whose subsequently developed perspectives my own study as presented here is not significantly informed: 'From Kant to Schelling to Process Metaphysics: On the Way to Ecological Civilization,' in *Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy*, Vol. VII, no. 2 (2011), and *The Philosophical Foundations of Ecological Civilization* (London: Routledge, 2016).

Between the earlier modern developments in the relevant areas of work in physics, chemistry and biology, it was in the mid-to-later eighteenth century that the related discipline of geology, the measurement of the nature, composition, and age of forms of non-organic life, began to develop its own, increasingly influential momentum. The combination of discoveries derived from work in the fields of geology and biology in many respects leads us to the most prominent English figure in modern science, following that of Isaac Newton in the seventeenth century, namely, Charles Darwin, contemporary of Karl Marx and in many respects equally feared by those who preferred the metaphysical and political status quo to remain in its current state. Darwin leads us, even if he barely managed to recognise the fact in his own lifetime, to the significance of Mendel's discoveries in Brno and the subsequent development of modern genetics.

All these scientific developments have had an enormous impact on the social and political environments in which we live, quite apart from the technological influence that related discoveries have exerted. Among them has been a reassessment of the nature of human consciousness and subjectivity in relation to the rest of nature and the history of the planet, the latter one particularly significant to the modern environmental movement whose essential roots lie in the ethics and politics of the Romantic era. In their *Economies of Signs and Space*¹ Scott Lash and John Urry refer to as 'instantaneous time', that form of time embodied in the modern, computer-based, post-'Big-Bang' form of socio-communicative relations increasingly dominant in our own era. Accompanying this form of time, in Lash and Urry's view has been a complementary, alternative conceptualisation, also emerging in considerable part both from developments in modern science and from the closely related environmental movement, a conceptualisation which they refer to as 'glacial time',² a conceptualisation that will shortly be explored further, in relation to aspects of the writing of D.H. Lawrence and Charles Olson.

In this 'glacial' notion of time human identity and activity are situated in a much broader, evolutionary perspective and the horizons of the future are left correspondingly more open in comparison to the immediate, if complex and diverse, gratifications of 'instantaneous time'.³ This particular conceptualisation of glacial time as thus characterised is itself at least distantly comparable to the earlier notion of *la longue durée* promoted by Lucien Febvre and the Annales school of historians and epitomised, in environmental terms by the work of Ferdinand Braudel, of whose historical approach, and its geological, geographical and general environmental emphasis, Elizabeth Clark observes, in relation to Braudel's *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*:⁴ 'the history of kings was here displaced by the history of the sea',⁵ will have a particular relevance to most of the concerns of the literary authors discussed in this book. As in the sociological literature, the connection to the immediate concerns of a dominant informational culture, as referred to in part by the 'instantaneous' time

¹ Scott Lash & John Urry, *Economies of Signs and Space* (London: Sage Publications, 1994), p. 242.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ferdinand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and The Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, translated in 1972 and 1973 by Sian Reynolds (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995; originally published in 1949).

⁵ Elizabeth A. Clark, *History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

of a technologically mediated and complexly organised present, needs to be kept carefully and constantly in view in relation both to the notion of a glacial time, and, as we shall see, particularly with regard to aspects of the work of Paul Carter and a number of what can be regarded, from the perspective provided in the present study, as related writers, in terms of closely comparable notions of space.

In some respects, the concept of glacial time, perhaps in part characterisable as an environmentally focused perspective on the social and cultural implications of modern technologies which it seeks to critically examine, and in relation to which it also aims to develop what are consequently considered to be more healthily viable alternatives along with aspects of literary and related cultural works, will be considered in the present study as forms of pastoral. The term pastoral has numerous connotations but might be considered as a form of at least potential nourishment, presenting the possibility of a better world, free of the corrupting elements associated with the current world in which it is conceived, or, in a more actively positive sense, that of seeking to develop a more attentively caring, as well as critical, approach to that same, but never quite the same, world by indicating the precise shortcomings of its contemporary social situation and perhaps also offering indications of how that situation might be improved.

In this respect, the notion of pastoral, as represented in the present study is close although very far from identical to many forms of what might be characterised as utopianism. The emphasis in pastoral might comparably be considered as pertaining to care (and not merely in its various Christian or specifically Heideggerian modalities) perhaps not for all, but for most forms of life, especially human life, as well as those related forms of life which are revealed as essential to the maintenance and development of human life; although, as in all human life, not just the lives of a tiny minority of socially privileged human beings. In this respect, while pastoral is not synonymous with utopia it can be claimed to contain a socio-ethical core whose political implications provide it with an inevitably intimate relationship with what we might provisionally term the more future-oriented notions associated with its conceptual cousin.

Raymond Williams's *The Country and The City* (1973) and Related Observations on Literature and Social Space

IN connection with these opening observations, the first of those perspectives considered relevant to relations between aspects of contemporary literary production and those elements indicated that I propose to consider, or reconsider, in relative detail, is Raymond Williams's far from stodgy analysis of relations between forms of literary expression and socio-cultural developments of the kind previously indicated in his literary-cultural history of Britain from the medieval period to the present day in *The Country and the City*.¹ My reasons for beginning with this, probably even to many contemporary students of British literature, relatively familiar classic of literary and cultural criticism partly derive from the book's recognised status, not merely in the field of literary studies, but in that of the relevant aspects of social and cultural geography and environmental studies, not least, in the latter case, the fields of eco-criticism and environmental criticism, with their particular focus on relations between the natural environment and

¹ Raymond Williams, *The Country and the City* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1973).

literature. What can be read as Williams's Marxist perspective on the writers he discusses perhaps also needs to be read in the broader context of the development of Marxism, as perhaps most extensively and notably surveyed at approximately the same time as Williams's book in Leszek Kołakowski's *Main Currents of Marxism*.¹

In the opening stages of *The Country and the City* Williams briefly considers elements of older, ancient Greek and Roman pastoral literary traditions, and, as in the book as a whole, with a particular, polemical focus on the harsh social realities alluded to in both Hesiod's *Works and Days* and Virgil's *Georgics*, to take two of the more prominent examples provided. Emphasis is placed upon ways in which pastoral can be viewed as expressive and critical of harsh social realities and forms of injustice, not merely an idealised escape from their inevitability. This stance is taken further in the strikingly dramatized connection, verging in some respects on the Dickensian, that Williams seeks to make between Arthur Young's imagined, if also very real, impoverished rural worker of the eighteenth century, whose lament 'All I know is, I had a cow and Parliament took it from me' and a series of observations on developments in the later medieval and Renaissance periods which can be viewed retrospectively as leading to that worker's plight.² An example of the extent and detail of Williams's approach to socio-historical observation is perhaps worth exemplifying by means of a relatively lengthy extract from his book at this point:

An upper peasantry, which had established itself in the break-up of the strict feudal order, and which had ideas and illusions about freedom and independence from the experience of a few generations, was being pressed and expropriated by the great landowners, the most successful of just these new men, in the changes of the market and of agricultural techniques brought about by the growth of the wool trade. A moral protest was then based on a temporary stability: as again and again in the history of rural complaint. It is authentic and moving yet in other ways it is unreal. Its idea of local paternal care, and of national legislation, seems to draw equally on a rejection of the arbitrariness of feudalism, a deeply felt rejection of the new arbitrariness of money, and an attempted stabilisation of a transitory order, in which small men are to be protected against enclosures but also against the idleness of their labourers. Thus a moral order is abstracted from the feudal inheritance and break-up, and seeks to impose itself ideally on conditions which are inherently unstable. A sanctity of property has to co-exist with violently changing property relations, and an ideal of charity with the harshness of labour relations in both the new and the old modes. This is then the third source of an ordered and happier past set against the disorder and disturbance of the present. An idealisation, based on a temporary situation and on a deep desire for stability, served to cover and evade the bitter conditions of the time.³

The extended observation provided here brings into play a number of elements, including longer and more temporary orders of social dispensation, the factors of social class, labour, property, and money and their relation to the development of idealisations and moral orders, which can themselves be expressive of the yearning for a better world

¹ Leszek Kołakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, translated by P.S. Falla (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004; originally published in 1976-1988, but, as Kołakowski indicates in his preface to the edition cited here, essentially conceived and written between 1968 and 1976).

² Williams, *The Country and the City*, p. 99.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

in forms as often consciously or unconsciously deceiving or self-deceiving in the fictional worlds they present and dramatize. The history of a new social order, replete with new forms of embedded social injustice, emerging from the reductive catastrophe of the ravages of the Black Death is portrayed by Williams as eventually developing into the cynical forms of so-called 'improvement' imposed upon later generations and the land they inhabited. In relation to such trends a shift in poetic expression is observed, from Jonson's idealised portrayal of a Penshurst magically as well as ironically transcending the actualities of social exploitation and imposition in addition to natural exigency, to a state close to complete breakdown whose expression Williams finds especially intriguing and distressing in his subsequent analysis of Goldsmith's 'The Deserted Village'. This analysis is itself preceded by a survey of 'the long process of choice between economic advantage and other forms of value' viewed by Williams as most graphically illustrated in the fate of the eponymous heroine of Samuel Richardson's *Clarissa*.¹

While acknowledging the positive elements in the new Romantic view of nature which fully emerges in the more radically philosophical view of nature to be found in the work of poets such as Wordsworth, Williams, despite his own personal interest in and insistence upon the significance of rural experience, looks to the essential breakdown of community, or at the very least traditional forms of it, to be found in the primary appeal to the creative but also substantially isolated power of the individual, poetic imagination. This form of imagination is often focused on the actual experience of the outcast individual, as in that of the old Cumberland beggar in Wordsworth's 'Resolution and Independence' and played out both in the poetry and actual life and death of another closely contemporaneous English poet, John Clare, the significance of whose work was more precisely depicted in another classic work of the mid-1970s, published a year prior to *The Country and the City*, John Barrell's *The Idea of Landscape and the Sense of Place 1730-1840*.²

Modern urban experience and its early literary expression in the work of William Blake and Charles Dickens are subsequently characterised by Williams as a parallel development in this increasingly atomised and organisationally refigured form of social life with the two authors in question seen as sharing a particular ability pertaining to 'a forcing into consciousness of the suppressed connections'.³ Dickens is presented by Williams as the inheritor and developer of William Blake's remarkable powers of penetratingly original critical caricature. Another relatively lengthy citation from Williams's own characterisation of Dickens's ability is included at this point in order to evidence adequately Williams's own dramatically concise and precise evocation of the nature of that ability and that society, an evocation which is, in certain respects, as decisive and resonant in its acuity of essential generalisation as aspects of Blake or Dickens themselves, if articulated in a different, distinctive modality of expression:

As we stand back and look at a Dickens novel the general movement we remember – the characteristic movement is a hurrying seemingly random passing of men and women, each heard in some fixed phrase, seen in some fixed expression: a

¹ Williams, *The Country and the City*, p. 61.

² John Barrell, *The Idea of Landscape and the Sense of Place 1730-1840: An Approach to the Poetry of John Clare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

³ Williams, *The Country and the City*, p. 149.

way of seeing men and women that belongs to the street. There is at first an absence of ordinary connection and development. These men and women do not so much relate as pass each other and then sometimes collide. They speak at or past each other intent above all on defining through his own words his own identity and reality; in fixed self-descriptions, in voices raised emphatically to be heard through and past similar voices. But then as the action develops, unknown and acknowledged relationships, profound and decisive connections, definite committing recognitions and avowals are as it were forced into consciousness. These are the real and inevitable relationships and connections, the necessary recognitions and avowals of any human society. But they are of a kind that are obscured, complicated, mystified, by the sheer rush and noise and miscellaneity of this new and complex social order.¹

This characterisation develops its own form of forcing to get to the essence of Dickens's uncanny ability to effectively dramatize both the rush and bustle but also the isolating pathos of modern urban experience and, through it, the precise, complex and unprecedentedly manipulative nature of that experience and the forces which are shaped to produce it. Williams articulates, with particular forcefulness, some of the ways in which there are profound elements of perceived social and emotional connection in Dickens's intuitive capacity to connect surface movement, momentary and individual expression, and the sheer noise and apparent chaos of modern urban experience to a form of narrative which can organise them into a recognisable social whole, one capable of affecting the emotional and cognitive social sensibilities of an unprecedentedly broad readership. The essential trajectory of Williams's analytical narrative in *The Country and the City* is the precise nature of a general, although as Williams himself indicates, complex, uneven, and varied movement, from predominantly rural to predominantly urban structures of experience. In some senses, as the evocation of the significance of Dickens's approach to the characterisation and expression of that experience indicates, the process reaches a particularly significant peak in the first part of the nineteenth century.

At the same time, one of Williams's central preoccupations in *The Country and the City* is with the specific developments of originally rural-based notions of community. This is also true of his own fictional work, from *Border Country* to the unfinished *People of the Black Mountains*. The latter is a fictionalised history for which Williams chooses to set the opening episode some 25,000 years earlier than the present day, an approach to chronological, and related socio-cultural considerations which provides a notable example of the deployment of a form of 'glacial time' as characterised by Scott Lash and John Urry and, soon after, by Manuel Castells. Earlier in *The Country and the City* Williams broaches the notion of the precisely delineated character of a thoroughly knowable community with its parallel, confident, but also precisely defined and circumscribed sense of moral judgement, as notably exemplified in the work of Jane Austen. The notion of the unknowable community and the strains on the reach of such judgement that it imposes are introduced in close relation to the work of Blake and Dickens and then examined further, partly through a comparison of the work of George Eliot and Thomas Hardy and its relevance to more contemporary attitudes to notions of community and social class, in connection with questions of judgement pertaining to the analysis of literature and its broader social and cultural significance.

¹ Williams, *The Country and the City*, p. 155.

The strains and limitations as much as the perceptions of George Eliot's depiction of rural and provincial urban life are focused upon by Williams to an even greater degree than in his reading of the relation of Jane Austen's fictions to the problems and limitations of notions of improvement. Eliot's attempts to make available characters and forms of social organisation with which her readers were unfamiliar are characterised as "knowable" in a deeply inauthentic but socially successful way'.¹ A partial contrast in this respect is made with Thomas Hardy, who is characterised as very far from being the type of educated peasant to which caricatured forms both his social and even intellectual status and abilities have often been reduced. By way of response to what are, in Williams's view, far from disinterested generalisations of this kind, Hardy's precise social station and development is carefully delineated and assessed, as is his approach to social questions in his fiction. In this increasingly involved context of socially polarised debate Williams's argument then moves from those analyses previously illustrated to a direct attack on current forms of patronising, and, as diagnosed, underlyingly dismissive, social stereotyping typified by a particular moment when 'a British Council critic described George Eliot, Hardy and Lawrence as our "three great autodidacts"'.²

This particular point in Williams's book is developed in relation to a critique of the socially exclusive notion of what counts as education in such a 'flat act of patronage'.³ This amounts, in Williams's view to the fact that 'none of the three was in the pattern of boarding school and Oxbridge which by the end of the century was being regarded not simply as a kind of education but as education itself; to have missed that circuit was to have missed being educated at all'.⁴ The criticism is specifically extended to Williams's most prestigious and respected contemporary, F.R. Leavis and again connected to George Eliot, as well as another representative of *The Great Tradition* (1948), presented in Leavis's celebrated and still influential book of that name, published some twenty-five years prior to the publication of Williams's *The City and The Country*. The relation of an inauthentic 'country house', ultimately developing into the self-enclosed world of the cosy rural detective novel, is adumbrated in the following passage, commenting on aspects of Eliot's *Daniel Deronda* (1876) where what is presented, in Williams's view, is:

a view from the box-seat; the recreation, after all the earlier emphasis of want, of a country-house England, a class England in which only certain histories matter. . . . She is able, conscientiously to narrow her range because the wide-ranging community, the daily emphasis of want, is supposed past and gone with old England. All that is left is a set of personal relationships and of intellectual and moral insights, in a history that for all valuing purposes has, disastrously, ended. We can then see why Mr Leavis, who is the most distinguished modern exponent of just this structure of feeling, should go on, in outlining the great tradition from George Eliot to Henry James. It is an obvious transition from that country-house England of *Daniel Deronda* (of course with Continental extensions and with ideas, like *Deronda's* Zionism, about everywhere) to the country-house England of James.⁵

¹ Williams, *The Country and the City*, p. 170.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 180-181.

Essentially provided in this extract as cited is an evidenced argument that the forms of limited disinterestedness displayed in the work of writers like Jane Austen, George Eliot, and, later, Henry James, are forms of analysis firmly situated in the socio-cultural context of a comparatively limited and exclusive critical purview. In relation to this critique, the precise political, social significance of Hardy's work is elaborated upon with a substantially socio-political and polemical emphasis upon the way in which an essentially exclusive, insufficiently critical, and authentically realist tradition of literary representation has gradually developed, in close relation to actual processes of social change, to produce a misleading and divisive notion of 'country' in both of its senses. Williams's appeal in this respect is very much to his own, specifically and explicitly located, sense of place and community in the country of the Black Mountain region in which he was born and raised: 'The only landscape I ever see, in dreams, is the Black Mountain village in which I was born. When I go back to that country, I feel a recovery of a particular kind of life, which appears, at times, as an inescapable identity, a more positive connection than I have known elsewhere'.¹

One of the problems encountered at this point, and one which Williams focuses upon throughout *The City and the Country*, is how to disentangle aspects of a well-intentioned but often nostalgically idealising conceptualisation of disappearing, or already lost, notions of community from actual pasts and practicable futures. The problem, as negotiated in Williams's approach to the developing organisational basis of relations between rural and urban settlements in terms of closely related connections and developments between money, property and social class, and further negotiated in Williams' fictional writing, is one which is itself directly related to the primary concerns and development of communism, in its various forms, and including some of the more catastrophic miscalculations and developments associated with some of those forms. The importance of Williams's book might be seen as lying not so much in the degree to which he attempts to provide a solution to the problems he raises as the manner in which they are raised, in terms of his analysis of relations between writing, social development, and questions of justice and community. Williams's contribution in this respect is to critically develop what he seeks to expose as the partly admirable but nonetheless socially parochial and, as indicated, consequently patronising, notion of society and culture analytically developed even by literary and cultural critics as hugely influential, perceptive and well-intentioned as F.R. Leavis.

Both Leavis and Williams seek to promote the virtues of kinds of writing that can truly engage with the precise conditions and complexities of the social environments they seek to express, invoke, dramatize and critically analyse, whether explicitly or implicitly. Williams, in this respect, seeks to indicate how even a cultural and literary analyst of Leavis's abilities and socio-political orientation is insufficiently aware of, insufficiently attentive to, and insufficiently capable of expressing an adequate range and precise degree of understanding of the kinds of socio-cultural engagements and conflicts involved in modes of social change which need to be interpreted with an appropriate combination of critically analytical historical understanding as well as relevant actual experience as well as applied in detail to processes of change over hundreds, and in the case of Williams's last fictional work, *People of the Black Mountains*, thousands of years.²

¹ Williams, *The Country and the City*, p. 84.

² Raymond Williams, *People of the Black Mountains: 1: The Beginning* (London: Paladin Grafton Books, 1990; originally published in 1989); 2: *Eggs of the Eagle* (London: Paladin 1992; originally published in 1990).

In one sense, Williams's development and criticism of Leavis is straightforward. The movement is towards a broader notion of society which takes fuller account of the experience of the less culturally privileged and normally less fully represented working classes, and in this respect Williams's approach indicates itself as being very much in the mode of many comparable approaches provided by Marxist cultural critics of the twentieth century. The specific significance of his contribution in this respect can be argued to reside in a particular sense of continuity and community, partly comparable with that of Leavis, but more precisely focused on exposing the limitations of Leavis's approach to an idealised rural past and the corresponding limitations of his critical approach with regard to the nature of current assessments of the nature and significance of both past and present forms of literary writing. Williams does not appear to advocate a form of violent, premature, counter-productive disruption to the current dispensation of cultural organisation but rather offers a patiently historical and critical analysis of its formation and an assessment of possible, positive combinations of elements perceived as particularly significant in relation to forms of future positive development. The emphasis on relations between individual and community is placed more on the forces shaping the latter than the powers of the former, though the power of the individual imagination is presented as closely related to an ability to articulate the nature and implications of a particular combination of forces at significant historical moments.

The position of F.R. Leavis, as characterised, in these respects might be viewed as ultimately more compatible with the kind of liberal, individualist approach perhaps most notably expressed or implied in Kant's late philosophy in relation to the significance of the aesthetic, though even there, as we shall see shortly, the role of the *sensus communis aestheticus* developed in the *Critique of Judgement*, essentially locates the genius represented by the appropriately talented individual in a community of sorts, if one relatively abstract in its primarily philosophical conception. Leavis's stance is more regularly characterised as deriving from the more culturally conservative elitism of Coleridge and, by connection, that of Novalis and those conservative political tendencies of German Romanticism which, despite their radical aesthetic implications, could be regarded as more mystically supportive of aristocratic elites, including monarchy.

The nature and implications of some of these perspectives as articulated in aspects of nineteenth and twentieth century German philosophy will be enlarged upon later in this chapter. For the moment, however, it will be more immediately pertinent to the concerns expressed in this brief survey of aspects of *The Country and the City* to connect Williams's approach in that book to some of the developments in relevant Anglo-American and European academic and intellectual discourse in the later 1960s and in the 1970s. Some of the representative figures in this respect are not necessarily directly or primarily connected to the field of literary criticism, though questions of culture are certainly central to the concerns of those writers considered. One area in which much of Williams's writing has attracted substantial interest is that of cultural and social geography, particularly of that type informed, like his own, by various strands of Marxist thinking. The British geographer David Harvey's *Social Justice and the City*¹ and Henri Lefebvre's *Production de l'espace*, (later translated as *The Production of Space*)² both

¹ David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City* (London: Edward Arnold, 1973).

² Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991; originally published in 1973).

published in the same year as Williams's *The Country and the City*, and within a year of the demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe housing development duly recorded in Harvey's later *The Condition of Postmodernity*,¹ occurring at '3.32 on 15 July 1972'² as the iconic moment of the end of modernism. *Social Justice and the City* marked David Harvey's explicit espousal both of a Marxist approach to geographical, or socio-spatial, analysis and a lasting primary focus on urban and economic issues as central to his approach to such analysis. Lefebvre's book can be seen as, in many respects, representing the most markedly ambitious and radically original perspective articulated in a long political-intellectual career which had spanned various developments in French Surrealist and Situationist, as much as Marxist and Communist, approaches to modernism, developments which had increasingly included conceptualisations of space as socially constructed and thereby fully open to human intervention, if in varying degrees, from different class perspectives.

Lefebvre's approach to questions of the social production of space, it can be claimed, is highly speculative and substantially philosophical in character in addition, as with that of a whole series of writers producing work contemporaneous with his own. The most prominent examples in socio-spatial terms might be regarded as those of Guy Debord and other members of the Situationist International, but as with these and other writers of the post-war period, a broader and often antagonistic debate with figures such as Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, and a range of other writers concerned with the social construction of human subjectivity are addressed in *The Production of Space*. It will be useful in the present context to include mention of a slightly later and comparably resonant publication, Michel de Certeau's *The Practice of Everyday Life*.³ De Certeau's book shares with Lefebvre's a direct concern with the way in which people's lives are formed and articulated through various forms of social practice, including those informed by spatial aspects. Lefebvre takes the approach of dealing with different forms of space as he conceptualises them, head-on, as it were, producing, in a fashion partly comparable to Williams's history of long-term social development in *The Country and the City*, but also, as already noted, in the Francophone context, the Annales school and the concept and approaches associated with *la longue durée*.

In this respect, in common with much of the intellectual thinking of the mid-twentieth century, and particularly that of many French and German thinkers of the period, Lefebvre also produces a self-consciously reflective, phenomenological, approach to the notion of space and its relation to social and cultural practices. De Certeau, by partial contrast, provides, in *The Practice of Everyday Life*, a series of reflections on the construction and appropriation of social space set in the broader context of reflections on the nature of social practices set in the terms of an evocation of a form of constant cultural guerrilla warfare waged, against those who constitute the dominant forces in contemporary culture, on the part of those obliged to inhabit that already dominated and regulated territory.

One can discern in the approaches of Williams, Lefebvre, and de Certeau a considerably Gramscian emphasis on the precise significance of the relation of cultural practices to broader social change in terms of an ultimately political resistance on the part of the dominated but one primarily presented through an approach in which the

¹ David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

² *Ibid.*, p. 39.

³ Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, translated by Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984; originally published in 1980).

human construction of and movement in socially constructed, physical and conceptual, space becomes a primary consideration. David Harvey, influenced by the work of numerous French thinkers in this period went on to produce a work of considerably Althusserian theoretical density in *Limits to Capital* before later producing the more directly accessible *The Condition of Postmodernity*.¹ By the time of the latter, however, he provides a more directly oppositional stance, not merely in relation to the development of what are analysed as exploitative, socially divisive forms of capitalist social relations but as damaging forms of collaboration with them in the form of what is perceived as a more recent and increasingly influential politics of difference as articulated most immediately in J.F. Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition* to which the title of his own book directly refers the reader, but also to elements of the work of Deleuze and Guattari.²

One of the most powerful forms of socio-spatial dialectic developed in elements of Anglo-American social geography in this later period, essentially that of the late 1980s and early 1990s is that between space and place, substantially addressed by Edward Relph, Doreen Massey, Neil Smith, and Nigel Thrift, to name an approximately representative handful of examples from a much broader range of both British and American geographers in this period. Edward Soja's *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory*³ provides perhaps the most widely appreciated overview of the general rise and significance of the socio-political significance of post-modern 'critical human geography'.⁴ Neil Smith, another renowned American urban geographer, in an article on 'scaling places', appearing alongside a series of subsequent reflections on relations on space and place as 'Homeless/Global: Scaling Places'⁵, including those by Harvey in 'From Space to Place and Back Again'⁶ and Doreen Massey 'Power Geometry and a Progressive Sense of Place',⁷ offers a precise, taxonomy of levels – 'body, home, community, urban, region, nation, region, global'⁸ in the context of his observations on 'the homeless vehicle', a tactical piece of street art, capable both of exposing and disrupting established forms of socio-spatial organization or 'different kinds of places'⁹ by a 'jumping of scales'.¹⁰

It can also be observed, in the context of this brief survey of relevant elements of critical, primarily Marxist-oriented, social geography in this period, that while Raymond Williams's work can be seen as interacting in part with elements of Anglo-American and French critical, substantially left-wing, socio-geographical thinking it was also subjected to criticism, in the Anglo-American context from perspectives themselves partly informed and inspired by post-phenomenological developments in French thinking

¹ David Harvey, *Limits to Capital* (London: Verso, 1982).

² Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, translated by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984; originally published in 1979).

³ Edward Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 1989).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁵ In *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change*, edited by Jon Bird, Barry Curtis, Tim Putnam, George Robertson & Lisa Tuckner (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 87-119.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-29.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-69.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

such as that represented by Lacan and Derrida. In this respect the notion of a substantially divided, and socially constructed self, can be seen as a partly antagonistic companion to that of the notion of socially constructed space.

Peter Ackroyd and the Claims of Aestheticism

To take one example which can shift us into consideration of a different but contemporaneous perspective focused on the analysis of literature, that of aesthetics, Peter Ackroyd's *Notes for a New Culture*, originally published in 1976, provides an early polemical attack on what are characterised as established attitudes to the study of literature in the Anglo-American context.¹ Ackroyd's polemic is primarily directed against the form of moralistic humanism which he perceives as being practised both by F.R. Leavis and Raymond Williams but one which he characterises as having its roots in what is viewed as the philistine scientism of a Thomas Sprat or a John Locke, and their reverence for an idealised plain speech without ornament.

By contrast, Ackroyd presents a history of modern French thinking which begins with the idea of writing as creatively developing a something from an apparent nothing and moving towards more recent developments in late nineteenth century decadent artistic practice, but also partly to aspects of English modernism, perhaps most notably Vorticism, rather than regulating the moral truths of 'life', seen as problematic but still worthy of partial respect in Leavis, though further degenerating into a form of 'sociological criticism' whose 'most notable exponent is Raymond Williams'.² The same ultimate criticism is applied both to Leavis and to Williams, that of their tendency 'to raise aesthetics into a morality'³ and, perhaps further, to attempt 'to take from literature what literature cannot provide – the ability to constitute an ideology of action'.⁴ There is perhaps a degree of potentially creative truth to this charge and its reflection on relations between social organisation, political action and the meditative reflection of kinds embodied in literature and closely related to aspects of traditional religious practice, including various aspects of writing within that context are certainly a factor worthy of consideration in the present context.

More immediately worthy of observation of this context, however, and as Ackroyd partially observes himself in his later preface to the book, written in 1993, is the subsequent and relative enlistment of aspects of what subsequently would be characterised in the Anglo-American context as aspects of French structuralist and post-structuralist theory, in combination with an equally early reference to elements of the poetry both of John Ashbery and more immediately pertinent for our purposes, that of J.H. Prynne, whose poetry is enthusiastically and somewhat magisterially characterised as 'the first poetry to exercise the full potential of the written language' in the sense that it 'excises completely the role of the poetic 'voice', whether as a personal or a synthetic mode of expression'.⁵ In this respect, Ackroyd goes on to argue 'The dispensation of poetry has been changed, and it is now the area in which every kind of language can emerge into

¹ Peter Ackroyd, *Notes for a New Culture* (Portchester, UK: Alkin Books, 1993; originally published in 1976).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 122-123.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

its historical and technical substance', an early articulation of what by now has become a more generally recognised and valued aspect of Prynne's work by those who draw value from it.¹

Ackroyd's ultimate points of theoretical reference, not ones, at least obviously, shared with Prynne are those of Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan, but in the spirit of a more complex notion of the 'play' of writing and its relation to forms of human subjectivity antagonistic to what is essentially characterised as the deadening effect of a worn out leftist-oriented humanism where literature is pushed in the direction of moral dogmatism rather than a vitality which takes the form of the creative exploration of the very nature of writing and human subjectivity and where a more positively meaningful notion of literature can re-emerge, freed from the developing puritanism of the previous two centuries.

After the subversive explosions of French 'structuralism' and 'post-structuralism' had expended their initial force and become a more established element of academic discourse in those spheres relevant to our discussion here, a more sustained examination of a somewhat older tradition of philosophical aesthetics, as primarily developed in the German tradition, but in which many of the more recent French theoretical stances were seen as having their origins, started to make its appearance in Anglo-American literary as much as philosophical contexts, providing the latter with reflective developments of an initially French-inspired theoretical influence. Ackroyd's monograph can be viewed as an early example of such work, represented from a perspective dissatisfied with the limitations of current work in literary studies but leaning, one might claim, in the light of Ackroyd's subsequent work, towards a more mystically conservative, even to the point of being traditionally spiritual, as well as Roman Catholic, if also substantially catholic, in the more literal sense of the word as potentially involving every person or thing; Ackroyd has a great deal to say, and write, about popular culture, in relation to literary modernism both in the latter stages of his monograph and in his subsequent publications, including the particularly powerful early novels and biographies, perhaps most notably of Dickens and Blake.²

Anthony Cascardi and Andrew Bowie on Aesthetics and Hermeneutics

ACKROYD'S relatively early intervention with regard to relevant debates concerning the nature of literary production and reception in the later 1970s can lead us in to consideration of the work of two slightly later authors concerned with questions pertaining to the literary and aesthetic, namely Anthony Cascardi and Andrew Bowie, though a brief discussion of relevant aspects of one book by the first writer will lead into a somewhat more extended discussion of a number of works by the second, even though the focus provided is primarily upon one, since Bowie's concerns are perhaps more directly pertinent to those of the present study. Cascardi provides us, in his book entitled *Consequences of Enlightenment*, with a reading of the political implications of Kant's *Critique of Judgement* (1790).³ The second writer, Andrew Bowie, has produced a series of books

¹ Ackroyd, *Notes for a New Culture*, p. 133.

² See the first section of Stephen Hardy, 'Versions of Pastoral Biography' in S. Hardy, M. Horáková, M.M. Kaylor & K. Prajznerová, *Alternatives in Biography: Writing Lives in Diverse English-Language Contexts*, for a related discussion of aspects of Ackroyd's early fiction and his biography of Dickens.

³ Peter Cascardi, *Consequences of Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

which, for the purposes of this study at least, might be considered as a form of trilogy dealing with the development of German-speaking philosophical treatments of aesthetics from the time of Kant through to that of the Frankfurt School and all of which are immediately relevant to the perspective provided in the present study, although the discussion of his work provided here will be restricted to relatively limited aspects of his wide-ranging analysis of the development and significance of modern German philosophical aesthetics. Those of his books referred to in the present context are *Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche*,¹ *From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy of German Literary Theory*,² and *Music, Philosophy, and Modernity*,³ although the primary focus here will be on aspects of the second of these.

To return to Anthony Cascardi's *Consequences of Enlightenment*, this book, as indicated, focuses primarily on the *Critique of Judgement* and on its implications for what might provisionally be characterised as more recent, leftist, interventions in terms of relations between culture and politics. The kernel of Cascardi's approach is evidenced in a concern with the role of 'affect', a term with various connotations, many of them taken up in the more recent developments of so-called 'affect theory' as developed by Brian Massumi, Michael Hardt and other interpreters of the work both of Gilles Deleuze, and stretching back, in modern European terms, at least as far as Spinoza's rationalistic approach to the significance of the affects, or feelings, and reason's effective negotiation of them, in his *Ethics*. Rather as with Martha Nussbaum's philosophical analysis and discussion of the nature and implications of classical Greek approaches to the negotiation of contingency, including that of overpowering emotions, by the limited means of rational thought and behaviour, as presented in her book *The Fragility of Goodness*, Cascardi focuses, partly through immediate reference to contemporaneous figures such as Derrida, on the significance of the 'passions' as something to be suffered externally, a 'constitutive outside' in terms of Derrida's critique of structuralism.⁴

This connection with philosophies of difference is explicitly acknowledged by Cascardi in this respect and developed further in partial opposition to Juergen Habermas's attack on such philosophies in terms of Cascardi's claim that Habermas, like Hannah Arendt, fails properly to distinguish between those appeals Kant makes to the significance of the *sensus communis aestheticus*, as distinct from the *sensus communis logicus*.⁵ For Cascardi, Habermas's failing in this respect, encouraged by his reading of Schiller, is to understand the aesthetic as 'coextensive with the socially constituted field of autonomous art'.⁶ Appealing directly to section 59 of Kant's third *Critique*, but also to Derrida and his phenomenological predecessor Husserl, in addition to subsequent, related theoretical approaches such as those of Slavoj Žižek, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Cascardi insists that, in contrast to Habermas's notion of completing the project of Enlightenment reason, or the closely related approaches of relatively conventional Marxists such as Terry Eagleton: 'the theory of aesthetic reflection marks affect

¹ Andrew Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche*, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003) (1st ed., 1990).

² Andrew Bowie, *From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy of German Literary Theory* (London: Routledge, 1997).

³ Andrew Bowie, *Music, Philosophy and Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

⁴ Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

⁵ See Cascardi, *Consequences of Enlightenment*, pp. 12-13.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

(pleasure, pain) as evidence that the process of Enlightenment is necessarily *incomplete*'.¹

Cascardi goes on to provide his own brief history of philosophical aesthetics from the time of Descartes in terms of the development from a negative to a positive conceptualisation of a 'confusion', using Baumgarten's term,² of sense and reason and subsequently moving to an evocation and analysis of Kant's radical development of earlier notions into a position from which, Cascardi claims, 'aesthetic judgements do not represent knowledge in the customary (cognitive or moral) sense at all' in the sense that although claims of taste, in Kant's own words "do not themselves contribute a whit to the knowledge of things, *they still belong wholly to the faculty of knowledge*".³ It is in the context of observations of this kind that Cascardi develops a sustained, not unsympathetic, but reflectively critical, reading of the inadequate nature of both Habermas's and Arendt's understanding of the significance of the role of the aesthetic and the *sensus communis aestheticus* in Kant in relation to Kant's understanding of the distinction he makes between reflective, as opposed to determinant, judgements.⁴ In ways which resemble those arguments of Bowie, some of which are to be considered shortly, Cascardi at the same time emphasises that, for Kant, while it is true that 'Artworks demonstrate a purposiveness that is without purpose and excite a pleasure that is not within the bounds of the agreeable, useful, or the good', one must bear in mind that 'it would be a mistake to think that the disinterested stance required by pure aesthetic pleasure is not itself impelled by a very powerful and distinct interest. Indeed, it is the particular *interest* of aesthetic disinterest that the third *Critique* struggles to sustain'.⁵

Part of this interest both for Kant and for Cascardi is in terms of the precise ways in which the aesthetic as characterised can have implications for social and political development. In this respect, both Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's conceptualisation of radical democracy and, to a lesser extent, that of Slavoj Žižek's 'enjoyment' (to be distinguished, at least in immediate terms, with the simpler and broader notion of enjoyment appealed to in relation to Spinoza earlier in this opening chapter of the present study) are of particular significance to the development of Cascardi's analysis in terms of his own criticism of what he perceives as a sustained critique, from Karl Marx (and even some aspects of T.W. Adorno) through Louis Althusser and Pierre Bourdieu, to Terry Eagleton, in terms of the representation of the aesthetic 'as part of a concealed effort on the part of idealist philosophy to confer legitimacy upon a political order driven by the interests of the modern state'.⁶

Cascardi's aim would seem to be to provide a more complex notion of the aesthetic as a form of indeterminate, disinterested, confusion of sense and knowledge, by moving from Baumgarten's early notion through Kant's peculiarly involved struggle in the third *Critique* and related texts, to a connection with the relevance of post-Lacanian notions of the divided subject negotiated in the work of Slavoj Žižek and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in particular. There is a considerable overlap in this respect

¹ Cascardi, *Consequences of Enlightenment*, p. 38.

² See *ibid.*, p. 61.

³ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement, Preface*, pp. 5-6, as cited, with italicized emphasis added, in Cascardi, p. 62.

⁴ Cascardi, p. 63.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

with aspects of Andrew McMurry's systems-theory-oriented but also substantially Lacanian reading of Emerson in the context of a consideration of relations between environmental politics and literature.

The more directly political implications of Kant's later thinking in this context – one which in Kant's time was involved in the developing relation between progress as represented by notions of Enlightenment and those raised by the French Revolution – are further explored by Cascardi in relation to Kant's essay 'An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing' published in 1798.¹ There, as Cascardi informs us in the relevant footnote, Kant outlines three models of history: 'The first is "terroristic" and indicates decline and disintegration. The second is "eudaemonistic" and proceeds according to the free will of the subject-agent. The third is "abderitic" and is exemplified by those who 'reverse the plan of progress, build in order to demolish'.² In relation to these distinctions, Cascardi argues, Kant's interest in the possibility of progress is connected to his notion of the aesthetic since it cannot be held directly in view and thus signs and the process of figuration, as in the related notion of 'hypotosis' elaborated in section 59 of the third *Critique* are what provide the criteria for the relevant form of judgement; in a further footnote³ Cascardi observes that 'Kant describes the figure of hypotosis as "presentation, *subjectio sub aspectum*"'.⁴

In relation to these conceptualisations on Kant's part and a series of discussions of related receptions of Kant's thinking in this area in relation to a series of twentieth-century philosophical perspectives, Cascardi focuses on the significance of the respect accorded by Kant, in relation to his notion of the *sensus aestheticus communis*, for what he viewed as the intuitive sense of justice displayed in the impetus for revolution in late eighteenth century France and in which context the French Revolution provides a representable, phenomenal fragment of the unrepresentable nominal aspect of a kingdom of ends with which the second part of the third *Critique* particularly concerns itself. It is in this context, Cascardi argues, that aesthetic judgment as characterised in the *Critique of Judgement*, again comes into play, with the communication of what is significant being the prior consideration even though the form that communication takes is through pleasure or pain, feeling as opposed to understanding, with the pre-conceptual informing the conceptual judgement. The analysis presented by Cascardi, represented here in a relatively crude, selective and abbreviated fashion, ultimately moves, as indicated earlier, to particular consideration of aspects of the work of Laclau and Mouffe, and of Žižek, as helpfully developing the precise perspective of relations between the divided subject, Kant's notion of radical aesthetic indeterminacy, and socio-political progress in terms of the notions of radical democracy presented in aspects of their own work. However, at this point we will leave consideration of Cascardi's examination of the political significance of Kant's conceptualisation of the aesthetic in order to move to a more detailed consideration of the partly related series of works by Andrew Bowie, as represented here primarily by aspects of the second book in the 'trilogy' as previously characterised and its more precise focus on questions of literary significance in relation to Kant and subsequent developments in German philosophical thinking of the aesthetic.

In the second of his three books exploring the aesthetic significance of works of art provided by developments in German aesthetic philosophy, *From Romanticism to*

¹ In Lewis White Beck, ed., *Kant on History* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merill, 1963), pp. 137-154.

² Kant, p. 140, cited in Cascardi, p. 133.

³ Cascardi, p. 141, footnote 19.

⁴ Citing Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, sect. 59, p. 221.

Critical Theory, Bowie begins his analysis of the potential significance of a work of literature, and by extension any work of art, by both taking issue with certain aspects of Terry Eagleton's approach as set out in the latter's *Literary Theory* and by returning, in historical terms, to the contextual origins of the Kantian and post-Kantian debate regarding the significance of the aesthetic in terms of the notorious 'Pantheism' controversy aroused by F.H. Jacobi's interpretation of the implications of Spinozism, as evidenced, in Jacobi's understanding of the matter, by Kant in his later, critical, philosophy. The basic issue at stake would appear to be Jacobi's negative conceptualisation of what he took to be the new form of immanentist nihilism initiated by what he viewed as Spinoza's admirably rigorous if troublingly systematic philosophy, one which essentially provided the basis for modern forms of 'determinate reason', subsequently conceptualised as 'negative determination' by Hegel, or, more generally speaking, in its even more precise and potentially more nihilistic, modern terms, science. The fundamental transcendence offered by traditional theology was, for Jacobi, lost, leaving a world of mechanical determinacy and total relativism where one thing could always be defined in terms of another – a Fall with no possibility of redemption other than, as far as Jacobi was concerned, a leap of faith which led back to that understanding of the world which had been lost.

The cultural, social and political implications of Spinoza's philosophical approach will be considered from a different perspective in the next part of this chapter. Bowie's concern, however, is not with Spinoza's philosophy as such but rather with the implications of the so-called 'Spinozism' that was the dominant focus of political debate in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as initiated, in Bowie's characterisation, by Jacobi's highly perceptive and appreciative but nonetheless damningly critical reading of its ultimate significance. Elements of the forms of negative determination increasingly apparent to the thinkers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are evidenced for Bowie in terms of reflections on relations between money (an increasingly prominent cultural medium for negatively determining the meaning or value of something in relation to something else, namely, its financial or, as more famously expressed later in the nineteenth century, 'exchange' value), scientific and related technological and industrial development, but also more 'scientific' approaches to the notion of language.

Such approaches have perhaps been most famously articulated, in more recent times, in relation to language through the basic notion of linguistic meaning as a form of relational difference as outlined by Ferdinand de Saussure. In Bowie's reading of extensions of the significance of negative determination in its developing cultural forms in the nineteenth century, they are considered in relation to one another but also over against the culture of the modern period as the expression of something, expressed by the Romantics, though not in the often over-simplified terms subsequently attributed to them, as 'feeling', and as a replacement for what was even then viewed as the increasingly outdated and inadequate notion of traditional theology offered by philosophical minds as sophisticated and perceptive as those of F.H. Jacobi.

The significance of Bowie's approach in the context of the concerns addressed in this opening chapter of my own discussion lies in the emphasis Bowie places on the complex nature of the thinking of relations between feeling and culture, particularly in early German Romanticism but also in terms of its subsequent development, in an increasingly technologised world, where science, as opposed to religion, had already

started to constitute the dominant metaphysical environment and where traditional relations between subjectivity and community were undergoing a process of radical fragmentation and disorientation. In this connection Bowie also focuses upon the significance of a form of communication dependent upon intuitive, indeterminate reason, characterisable as ‘feeling’, but in a specific and again considerably complex sense, ultimately most fully and effectively represented, for the purposes of Bowie’s analysis, by the modern hermeneutic approach of Friedrich Schleiermacher, with its emphasis on the significance of intersubjective communication in relation to our use and understanding both of each other and the use and nature of the language which profoundly contributes to the nature of that understanding. Like Cascardi, however, Bowie is also at pains to make it clear that his notion of the significance of communication is far from identical to that offered by Habermas’s predominantly cognitive characterisation of communicative reason, one which fails to recognise the degree to which aesthetic communication needs to be identified as a basic and complex component of human social relations, rather than as a somewhat compartmentalised element of social interaction that can be appended to a more basic rational core.

A significant element of Bowie’s approach is represented by his tracing of a progression from Kant’s categorical imperative, and its primary and immediate concern with questions of morality, through the related notion, derived from Novalis, of an ‘aesthetic imperative’ to the supra-rational self-questioning of poetic discourse embodied in the closely connected conceptualisation of romantic irony. The latter places a new emphasis, derived substantially from Kant’s own examination of the nature and potential significance of the aesthetic, on the ethical significance of imaginative thought, significance which can transcend the boundaries of determinate reason by producing a new form of open-ended, indeterminate, reason, which is potentially infinite in scope.¹

The problem here is whether one is dealing with a form of self-retreating and mystifying approach to the problem of replacing the securities and mysteries of traditional, primarily theological, religion, developed over centuries, with a form of individualistic self-expression that has the potential simply to support the atomisation of traditional forms of community by contemporaneous processes of modernisation, a problem that is still, it can be argued, substantially pertinent to any form of discussion of the nature and significance of modern artistic thought and expression. In this context, a third imperative is introduced by Bowie, one which he terms the ‘hermeneutic imperative’, this time derived from his discussion of the work of Schleiermacher but in close connection with related developments in thinking on the part of Kant, Friedrich Holderlin, Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis, and Friedrich Schelling in particular.²

Bowie’s discussion of German philosophical aesthetics as they develop both in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries never lets out of its purview the significance of an issue already raised by Jacobi in the new, modern, context, that of the relation between knowledge, meaning and truth. In its twentieth century context this relation is pursued by Bowie in terms of a dialogue or dialectic developed between two differing notions of truth. The first is that of the representational as developed by logical positivism and the significance of Alfred Tarski’s iconic positing of the tenet that the statement or proposition that ‘Snow is white’ can only be true if and only if snow is white.

¹ See Bowie, *From Romanticism to Critical Theory*, p. 86.

² See *ibid.*, p. 89. Although, as Niklas Luhmann argues in the final chapter of his late work *Theory of Society* (for which a full reference is provided in a later, immediately pertinent, section of this chapter), the whole conceptualization of intersubjectivity as currently posited is itself becoming increasingly questionable.

The second is represented by the example of Martin Heidegger's notion of truth as the form of disclosure of an aspect of understanding of the world or an aspect hitherto hidden from or lost to our perception or understanding and thus close to an understanding, at least from Heidegger's perspective, of the ancient Greek (and, for that matter, modern Greek) word for truth, 'alethia', as a transcending of the ignorance or indifference imposed by Lethe, in terms of its symbolic and etymological representation, cultural ignorance or forgetfulness. In modern forms, in Heidegger's substantially poetico-ontological and etymologically suasive approach, this type of cultural amnesia takes the form of an indifference or blindness to the true nature and significance of 'Being', essentially produced over the last two millennia of European civilisation in inadvertent combination with humanity's technical dominance over those elements of nature apparently antagonistic to humanity's own survival, a development especially intensified in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

It should be clear at this point that it is not Bowie's intention simply to privilege Heidegger's perspective over that of the logical positivists; he is substantially critical of much of Heidegger's philosophising. Bowie's intention, it would appear, is rather to highlight, particularly in the light of philosophical developments in the later part of the twentieth century, the productive potential of a positive dialogue between these two attitudes towards truth, as represented in terms of the relatively recent development of a related dialogue he perceives as increasingly taking place between aspects of Anglo-American analytical philosophy and perspectives derived from German and French philosophy which are generally more sympathetic to that of Heidegger.

Essential to this project is the critical exposure of the overly mystical and misleading aspects of the latter position, as partly represented by aspects of Heidegger's philosophical approach, while at the same time holding on to some of its more substantial insights through a similar critique of analytical philosophy, a critique which is again appreciative of the latter's positive, rigorously perceptive aspects regarding relations between truth and language as well as some of its, often productive, but in certain respects dubious approaches to the nature of representation, as perhaps most famously discussed and interrogated relatively in recent times in works such as Richard Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*.¹ This approach involves Bowie in an exploration of the roots of the divergence between the two positions as generally indicated in addition to the provision of a discussion of relevant perspectives provided by contemporary figures, including Rorty but focusing in particular on aspects of the work of Donald Davidson, among a range of other contemporary perspectives. In this context, the significance of Schleiermacher is considered in relation to Habermas and Gadamer and to the shortcomings of the precise nature of the stance taken by both of these leading contemporary figures in the field of modern German philosophical hermeneutics. Bowie's discussion in this respect involves a re-examination not only of our attitudes to what constitutes truth but, with particular reference to Davidson, to what constitutes language.

To return to the historical beginnings of the philosophical concerns with which Bowie engages, Jacobi's conception of truth is presented as closely related to that of Kant in terms of the danger presented by human dignity to systems of mediation which are perceived as relatively indifferent to truth conceived as that 'which first gives value

¹ Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).

to knowledge'.¹ Comparison is made with Kant's approach to the significance of value as financial price as expressed in his conceptualisation of dignity in the *Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) in this respect, and in terms of observations which strongly anticipate those of Marx in a slightly later period, as well as T.W. Adorno's concern to explore and develop the possibilities of the concept of 'non-identity' in an 'identity culture' whose co-ordinates are established with increasingly conformist thoroughness by the parameters of a determinate form of reason. In this respect part of the significance of what we might mean when we talk about and use 'language' has to do with the interplay between its propositional and non-propositional, or what might also be termed its 'musical' aspects in certain contexts; as Bowie observes in all his relevant major publications, increasing significance is attached to the nature and development of abstract music in the nineteenth century.

The problematic nature of what we mean by language is, as Bowie indicates, characterised in a significant sense by Davidson's well-known observation, in his discussion of 'prior' and 'passing' theories in relation to the interpretation of one speaker's words by another, in his late essay 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs' that 'there is no such thing as a language . . . if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed',² the relation of human freedom and dignity to modern developments of determinate or instrumental reason, and relations between human perception, cognition, imagination, and, particularly, interpretation and communication are in some ways brought together, as we initially observed, in Bowie's reading of what for him constitutes Schleiermacher's 'hermeneutic imperative', as a further and crucial development of Kant's categorical and Novalis's aesthetic imperatives.

In this context, Bowie provides us with a helpful 'prehistory' of hermeneutics in terms of the relatively bewildering range of medieval metaphysical interpretations of the world or nature as such through the later, predominantly Lutheran, emphasis on a post-Thomist sense of stability and literalness with regard to the word as expressed in the Bible and the interpretation of its spirit, and towards the development of a subsequent tendency to more personal, individually subjective, notions of interpretation. The Enlightenment phase of hermeneutics, where Spinoza makes another appearance as a significant early figure in terms of an emphasis on 'rational' interpretation which focuses upon interpretation of an actually existing world as in principle, if not necessarily in detail, relatively unproblematic, is then briefly represented and discussed in relation to figures such as J.M. Chladenius and G.F. Meier. Chladenius can be considered, in certain respects, as being as significant a figure in the history of modern hermeneutics as Schleiermacher (Frederick Beiser, it might be noted at this point, essentially begins his own recent study of *The German Historicist Tradition*³ with a reassessment of the precise significance of Chladenius both as historian and hermeneuticist). Bowie provides his own prefatory survey of developments in hermeneutics in the modern European tradition, but his own primary focus is ultimately on the specific significance he wishes to derive from what he views as Schleiermacher's especially complex,

¹ F.H. Jacobi, *Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn von F. H. Jacobi* (Breslau: Löwe, 1789), p. 27; as cited in Bowie, *From Romanticism to Critical Theory*, p. 49.

² Donald Davidson, *The Essential Davidson*, edited by Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 265; as cited in Bowie (1997), p. 51.

³ Frederick C. Beiser, *The German Historicist Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 25-62.

communicative, approach and its particular relevance to contemporary conceptualisations of and controversies regarding relations between subjectivity, intersubjectivity, communication, and their structuralist and post-structuralist discontents.

In one respect this development, as Bowie traces it, is viewed as ultimately culminating in the work of Bernardo Bolzano and the beginnings of what Bowie terms the 'semantic' as opposed to 'hermeneutic' tradition, essentially the same opposition or distinction as that represented by the difference between Tarski's and Heidegger's approaches to relations between language and truth in the context of the earlier part of the twentieth century. Schleiermacher's crucial, chronologically intermediate, contribution is then directly approached in terms of the fact that the two positions outlined tend to converge or at least 'intersect'¹ in relation to the problem they both face, that of the lack of philosophical grounding of meaning, knowledge and truth previously identified by Jacobi as the fundamental problem presented by modern, determinate, relational, 'Spinozist' reason, a problem for Jacobi only to be resolved by a *saltus mortale*, a leap of faith in the ultimate truth of God as the transcendent creator, as opposed to what might be considered the more theologically modern, pantheistic, philosophical and metaphysical stance of Spinoza's *deus sive natura*.

The problem of knowledge, truth, and meaning as Schleiermacher confronts it is presented by Bowie in terms of one of Schleiermacher's more Romantically aphoristic remarks, very much in the self-consciously paradoxical vein of Schlegel or Novalis, that 'In order to understand someone who half understands himself, one must first understand him completely, but then only half as, and just as well as he understands himself.'² While there is a clearly perceptible relation here to later figures such as Habermas, Bowie's emphasis is on the element of 'creative interpretation' involved in Schleiermacher's intersubjectively focused hermeneutical approach. Bowie makes two primary introductory claims in relation to Schleiermacher in this context. First, that in contrast to any specialised form of hermeneutics, pertaining to, say, theological or legal usage, Schleiermacher 'aims at giving rules for the 'art of interpreting *any* linguistic utterance'.³ The connection between analytical or 'semantic' approaches is emphasised, with Bowie observing of Schleiermacher 'that he shares a crucial presupposition' with analytical approaches to language in claiming 'that it consists of a finite number of relatively fixed elements, which can be used for an infinite number of semantic and other purposes'.⁴

For Bowie, the divergence between the two 'traditions' semantic/analytic and hermeneutic appears to be in terms of the way these 'constraints', as he terms them, are provided with different forms of status.⁵ With reference to more immediately contemporary philosophical positions, Michael Dummett is seen as 'continuing the semantic tradition initiated by Bolzano in terms of his claim that 'a full-blooded theory of meaning' must provide an explicit account 'not only of what anyone must know in order to know the meaning of any expression, but of what constitutes having such

¹ Bowie, *From Romanticism to Critical Theory*, p. 103.

² Friedrich Schlegel, *Kritische Schriften und Fragmente 1-6* (Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1988), p. 147; as cited in Bowie (1997), p. 105.

³ Bowie, *From Romanticism to Critical Theory*, p. 106.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

knowledge'.¹ Dummett's stance is then contrasted with a partial critique of his position provided by Beate Rössler who herself references Schleiermacher, despite her prevailing preference for Dummett's approach, in questioning the presumptions involved in Dummett's position, namely, in Bowie's words, 'the presupposition that we both understand what it means for something to be true'.²

This further appeal to an ultimate regress in establishing the foundations of meaning could almost be termed, somewhat paradoxically in terms of Jacobi's fears regarding relations between truth and human dignity, 'the human factor', where what is ultimately at play is the gulf between reality and perception, between one human being's sense of the world, and of words, and that of another, but characterised, as we shall see, in Schleiermacher's terms, as the groundless ground for a precise but never fully determinable attempt for *ego* to interpret the apparent communication provided by *alter*. My own use of this marginally different terminology at this point is intended as a gesture in the direction of the discussion and dispute involving Habermas and Niklas Luhmann with regard to some of the possible implications of the latter's outlining of an autopoietic systems theory, as considered at a later stage in this chapter of the present study.

Bowie's particular insistence at this stage of his argument is that Schleiermacher's appeal to an art of interpretation in this ontologically and phenomenologically vexed context is not to any mystical kind of intuition but to a form of methodological stance which is quite close to contemporary forms of pragmatics-based contextualism. In this respect Bowie cites, via Rössler, Schlegel's observation that "We call art . . . every compound product in which we are aware of general rules, whose application cannot in the particular case be again brought under rules".³ This is a definition quite close, as Bowie observes, to Kant's attempt to form a notion of reflective aesthetic judgement, though more precisely focused in terms of its general approach to the nature and significance of language. At the same time, Bowie concludes, from his analysis of a series of cited observations from relevant texts by Schleiermacher, that all forms of normatively guided interpretative decision must ultimately depend on a form of consensual foundation, though one which can be viewed as constantly revisable. With respect to Schleiermacher's claim that 'In the thoughts of every person there is truth only to the extent to which truth is in language, and it is only in language to the extent that the word and thought of each individual are the same',⁴ Bowie sees a clear convergence with Habermas's position, in terms of 'an orientation towards consensus based on the necessarily intersubjective aspect of language'.⁵ At the same time, Bowie emphasises, this is not because 'consensus is entailed a priori by the ready-made nature of language and logic' but because of the need for it 'to be *presupposed* as a *goal* if interpretation is to begin at all'.⁶

In this respect, Bowie underlines throughout his greater affinity with Habermas's concern with communicative coherence, in opposition to what both Habermas and

¹ Michael Dummett, *The Seas of Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 22; as cited in Bowie (1997), p. 107.

² Bowie, *From Romanticism to Critical Theory*, p. 108.

³ Schleiermacher in Rössler (1990), pp. 22-23; as cited in Bowie (1997), p. 111.

⁴ Bowie, *From Romanticism to Critical Theory*, p. 117.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

Bowie view as the tendency to incoherence in this respect on the part of many post-structuralist approaches to the nature of relations between subjectivity, language, knowledge, meaning, truth and, ultimately, to any form of socio-cultural coherence. It is in fact at this point in his discussion that Bowie includes a lengthy excursus on what for him is the ultimately indefensible position offered by Lyotard in *The Differend* with respect to his characterisation of notions of incommensurable difference.¹ This, in turn, leads Bowie to an observation on the common misunderstanding of the Romantic notion of feeling as ‘the sign of conceptual laxity, rather than as a *logical* condition for an account of the structure of self-consciousness’, one which includes ‘all those accounts of interpretation, from behaviourism to Lyotard, which wish to exclude consideration of the subject from the understanding of utterances.’²

To somewhat baldly summarise the relatively detailed account provided at this stage of Bowie’s discussion, human thought for Schleiermacher, it is claimed, is located ‘between the poles of linguistically instantiated – ‘schematised’ – objective representations’, and the irreducibility of ‘feeling’.³ The particular danger of the semantic-objectivist position is that of trying to reify ‘language’. In this respect, by contrast, Schleiermacher’s approach comes quite close, as we shall see, to one represented by Luhmann’s version of systems theory in that for Schleiermacher language can be characterised as a “system of movements of the organism which are simultaneously expression [on the side of ‘feeling’] and sign [on the side of ‘thought’] of the acts of consciousness as the cognising faculty, under the character of the notion of schematism”.⁴ As with Habermas, there is a significant and immediately articulated preoccupation with ethical implications in that Bowie contends that understanding in Schleiermacher ‘does not derive final foundations from already existing rules but rather imposes a continuing obligation upon free actors to attempt to see the world from the viewpoint of the other, and to articulate the potential created by the other, *including oneself as other* in self-reflexive interpretation’.⁵

In terms of the significance of the literary work as created and interpreted it is Schleiermacher’s approach, Bowie argues, which can then be used to counter Terry Eagleton’s claim that all literature is ultimately a form of ideology in that ‘the truth-content which transcends the context of production of a literary text can only be made accessible via a presupposition of *freedom* on the part of both the producer and the receivers of the work’.⁶ Works of art can never possess totally definable intrinsic properties since the relation indicated here ‘still leaves open the possibility that these properties may turn out to be mistakenly attributed and that judgement on them will later be revised. The crucial point is whether the work sustains the need to keep revising its interpretations’.⁷

A crucial concern in Bowie’s discussion of the precise nature of artistic communication, particularly as highlighted in his discussion of Schleiermacher, is the constant, unstable, negotiation of modern forms of subjectivity and related approaches to truth and meaning in the context of socio-cultural and technological developments in the last

¹ Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Differend*, translated by Georges Van Den Abele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989; originally published in 1983).

² Bowie, *From Romanticism to Critical Theory*, p. 121.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Schleiermacher, *Ethik* (1812-13) (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990), p. 65; as cited in Bowie (1997), p. 124.

⁵ Bowie, *From Romanticism to Critical Theory*, p. 125.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

two centuries. It is perhaps important to remind ourselves at this point that his discussion of Schleiermacher's approach to language, meaning, and interpretation is not simply a matter of defending the continuing significance of literature and other forms of art from the charge of being simply forms of ideology but a more precise characterisation of the relation of artistic practices to other elements of social formation by means of approaching correspondingly more precise relations between 'semantic' and 'hermeneutic' approaches to conceptualisations of language in a spirit of critical dialogue rather than one of exclusive competition. It is in one sense not surprising then that further reference to Donald Davidson is made at this point in Bowie's discussion in terms of the interest that both Davidson and Schleiermacher substantially indicate in relation to what Davidson terms 'the infinitely difficult problem of how a first language is learned'.¹ A similar point is made, if in slightly different terms by Cascardi with regard to the far-ranging nature of the significance of Kant's philosophical exploration of modern subjectivity and the constant danger of restricting the play between conditioning conditions and the ability of the subject to establish a sense of interpretive freedom in relation to them.

For both Jacobi and Kant, part of the problem posed by the new, developing conditions of modern thought and subjectivity was how to negotiate a change from one metaphysical environment to another or a series of others. In one of his more recent books, *Music, Philosophy and Modernity*,² Bowie approaches this problem through an analysis and discussion of the approaches provided by essentially the same set of philosophers discussed in his previous two books, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity* and the book mainly referred to in the present context *From Romanticism to Critical Theory*, to the nature and significance of music in the modern era. At the outset of the last of these three books Bowie makes use of aspects of Martha Nussbaum's approach to questions of emotional intelligence, in *Upheavals of Thought* in terms of her distinction between two conceptualisations of metaphysics.³ The first is provided by Heidegger in whose philosophical approach 'Metaphysics is . . . construed . . . as itself becoming modern science, which increasingly determines the fate of humankind in the name of predicative laws that enable us to control it.'⁴

The second conceptualisation, for which Bowie expresses a marked preference, is that provided by Nussbaum, where in the course of a discussion of classical and Nietzschean perspectives on tragedy and music she observes that 'Musical works are somehow able – and, after all, this "somehow" is no more and no less mysterious than the comparable symbolic ability of language – to embody our idea of the urgent need for and attachment to things outside ourselves that we do not control, in a tremendous variety of forms'.⁵ This characterisation of a form of emotional intelligence is in turn characterised by Bowie, at the same opening stage of his own discussion, as 'a construal of emotions as judgements of value' in an age characterised by an 'increasing fragility of the subject'.⁶ In this respect it would appear that Bowie seeks to provide an alternative to what might be termed an *overly* divided subject (as itself provided by aspects of

¹ Donald Davidson in *Truth and Interpretation*, edited by Ernest Lepore (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 441; as cited in Bowie (1997), p. 134.

² Andrew Bowie, *Music, Philosophy and Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

³ Martha Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

⁴ Bowie, *Music, Philosophy, and Modernity*, p. 33.

⁵ Nussbaum (2001), p. 272; as cited in Bowie (2007), p. 34.

⁶ Bowie (2007), p. 34.

French post-structuralist thinking) in the form of the kind of relations between categorical, aesthetic and hermeneutic imperatives which he outlines in relation to Kant, Novalis, and Schleiermacher and subsequent developments in German philosophical approaches to the nature and significance of the aesthetic in its modern cultural context.

This observation essentially concludes our discussion of reflections on the development of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophical aesthetics and aspects of their relation to modern subjectivity as constituted both at the time they were written but also in relation to the increasingly problematised nature of subjectivity presented in aspects of more contemporary philosophical thought, in the case of the present study as represented by Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri, Castells, Gare, Luhmann¹ and McMurry, as well as, subsequently, poetry and closely related forms of prose, notably the work of J.H. Prynne and Paul Carter but also the three poets considered in less extensive terms in the next chapter, Charles Olson, Edward Dorn, and David Jones.

Having made these comments, a transition towards the next major constituent element of the issues broached in this opening chapter might nonetheless be provided by observing that one aspect of ‘feeling’ about which Bowie has relatively little to say – mainly because of the philosophical tradition he explores – is the relation of sexual feelings to the socio-cultural formation of subjectivity, a concern more directly addressed in the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, aspects of whose work we shall shortly consider, though not in fact, in primary relation to the substantially psychoanalytical and somewhat Reichian approach to sexuality and society they provide, particularly in *Anti-Oedipus*, but through a brief consideration of aspects of the later *A Thousand Plateaus*, aspects of which we shall focus upon after a comparative discussion of elements both of Deleuze’s and Antonio Negri’s reading of Spinoza and their relevance to questions of subjectivity and environments in the later twentieth century.

An appendix to the discussion of the aesthetics-focused perspectives of Casacardi and Bowie and a bridging passage, as it were, to the more psychoanalytically informed work of Deleuze and Guattari, can, however, briefly be provided here by way of reference to Camille Paglia’s more generally known and inimitably provocative survey of English literature, *Sexual Personae*. Paglia, it might be recalled, is herself a former student of the at least equally celebrated American literary and cultural theorist and critic, Harold Bloom, whose own approach to the significance of literature, itself partly directed by his readings of the work of the English Romantics and a characteristically individualistic and individual-based approach to literary theory, is in turn informed by aspects both of psychoanalytic theory, in the form of Freud, by aspects of his study of the Kabbalah, and, as with the post-structuralists, by elements of Nietzsche’s philosophical approach.

Like Bowie, though more directly, aggressively and polemically, in his later work, perhaps most notably *The Western Canon*,² initially bemoaning the influence of contemporary literature as ‘the School of Resentment’,³ Bloom is keen to defend the significance of literature and art in general as fundamental to the more positive aspects of the

¹ In Nikolas Luhmann, *Art as a Social System*, translated by Eva M. Knodt (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000; originally published in 1995), Luhmann provides a different perspective on such questions, one to be more fully considered in a successor to the present study.

² Harold Bloom, *The Western Canon* (New York: Riverhead Books, 1994).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

formation of modern subjectivity but, like Paglia, does so in a self-consciously accessible fashion, that might, in a relatively restricted but positive sense, be termed populist, despite the somewhat Nietzschean pose of cultural elitism one might interpret as being expressed in Bloom's short, deft sketches of the significance of literature in general and the specific significance of its greatest practitioners. This emphasis on expressing complex and significant ideas in as accessible a form as possible might itself be regarded as one of the more substantial and positive contributions of the American democratic attitude towards culture, despite Bloom's apparent elitism, and one which is in direct stylistic opposition to Lacan-influenced approaches to verbal presentation in the best known or most notorious 'traditions' of some French 'structuralist' and 'post-structuralist' theoretical perspectives and their, equally self-conscious, 'difficult', forms of expression.

It is this element in Bloom's approach which in some respects seems to be notably apparent in that of Paglia in her own book, *Sexual Personae*.¹ Like Bloom, Paglia incorporates, in addition to a very considerable degree of erudite literary scholarship, a great deal of psychoanalytic theory, in the form of Jung as much as Freud, as well as Nietzsche into her specific approach to questions of literature, culture and subjectivity, although these are by no means the only perspectives of which she avails herself. She does so in a manner which is explicitly hostile to what she characterises as the over-intellectualised approach not merely of recent literary and cultural theory but of the whole history of the modern academic approach to literature and culture. As with practitioners of modern cultural studies like Raymond Williams, Paglia is keen to emphasise the significance of popular as much as relatively, elitist literary culture, but from a perspective which might be viewed as in some respects closer not only to Bloom, but to the position taken by Peter Ackroyd as presented earlier in this chapter.

A significant element of influence in Paglia's cultural stance is the research and writing of the early twentieth century anthropologist, and feminist, Jane Harrison, who, interestingly, in relation to the next chapter in this book, also turns out to be a major influence both on Charles Olson and Paul Carter. Harrison's conceptualisation of the 'chthonic' is deployed by Paglia in relation to an updated version of the opposition between the Apollonian and the Dionysian developed in German philosophical aesthetics and perhaps most famously dramatized in Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872). In Paglia this opposition is developed into a dialectic involving the still considerably masculine, ruthlessly formalising, seeing eye of culture (the history of painting plays a major role in Paglia's analysis) and the messy, tactile fecundity of a teeming, chaotic and ferociously cruel, as well as primarily feminine, nature. The role of the artist, whether it is William Shakespeare, Emily Dickinson, Elvis Presley, or Madonna, in this context, is to express a certain form of significantly influential sexual persona. Paglia's approach is, in Nietzschean fashion, conveyed as much in the style as in the content of *Sexual Personae*, displaying a like degree of tension between the chthonic and the artistic which is part of her own, deliberately specific and aggressive, stance as a writer and cultural analyst who wishes to properly explore not only the significance of some of the major writers in the English, including the American, literary canon, in terms of their own very specific and intense expression of particular sexual personae but also in terms of their significance in culturally communicative terms of the influence of such personae. In this respect she provides an important companion or parallel to the kinds of

¹ Camille Paglia, *Sexual Personae* (London: Penguin Books, 1990).

communication, and their relation to what might be seen, not least by Paglia herself, as more intellectualised, Romantic notions of ‘feeling’ as previously presented as well as their relation to aspects of contemporary ‘popular’ culture, a categorisation, as provided here, which includes the whole of cinema and ‘pop music’, itself including figures such as not only Presley and Madonna but also Bob Dylan.

In the present context, Paglia, (though as with Bloom and Nussbaum her particularly well-known work will simply be referenced rather than discussed in further detail) can be seen as providing not only a particularly vivid articulation of a significant dimension of the culturally and naturally conditioned aspects of ‘feeling’ which can be seen as slowly being philosophically negotiated, via Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and then Freud and Jung, in the modern German-speaking tradition of the analysis of human culture and behaviour but also a connection, as previously indicated, with aspects of the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in terms of their own inclusion of psychoanalytic elements in an approach equally related to those elements of French and Anglo-American socio-spatially oriented cultural interventions discussed earlier in this chapter.

Gilles Deleuze on Baruch Spinoza

IT is in this light, if not, as indicated, in primary relation to questions of sexuality, that we can now turn to aspects of the work of Deleuze and Guattari particularly relevant to the subsequent analysis provided here as well to that of two figures whose work is partially influenced by theirs, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt. The primary concerns in relation to the collaborative work by these respective pairs of thinkers will be socio-spatial in nature but will be prefaced by what amounts to a more substantial consideration of how both Deleuze and Negri had, prior to their collaborations with Guattari and Hardt respectively, presented closely related but also differing accounts of the significance of the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, an inspirational figure not only for the ‘Spinozist controversy’ as previously discussed by Andrew Bowie, but equally inspirational to much nineteenth century German philosophical thinking as well as providing a particular impetus for much Marxist writing in the twentieth century, perhaps most notably in the French twentieth century context, from at least the time of Kojève’s substantially Marxist-oriented reading of Hegel, through thinkers such as Althusser, and through to both Deleuze and the more direct, Gramscian Marxism of Negri, and in most respects the most notoriously radical as well as influential thinker of the last three centuries.¹ In both Deleuze’s and Negri’s readings of Spinoza the question of relations between power, politics and the nature of ‘nature’ as presented by the coiner of the equally famous and notorious ‘deus sive natura’ will be pertinent both to discussion of the later collaborative work of Deleuze and Negri and that of Niklas Luhmann.²

¹ See Robert Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), for a thorough account of the nature and extent of Spinoza’s influence in the period, indicated by the subtitle of the book.

² It should perhaps be observed in this context that, whatever the importance attached to them in the present study, the readings of Spinoza’s philosophy provided by Deleuze and Guattari constitute an almost infinitesimally small proportion of the relevant literature on Spinoza. *The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) provides one reference to Deleuze and two references to Negri,

In his philosophical writing prior to his collaborations with Félix Guattari, Gilles Deleuze published a series of studies on the respective philosophical approaches of David Hume, Henri Bergson, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Baruch Spinoza. In the present context it is his longer study, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*,¹ which will initially concern us here, though with some initial reference to the slightly later *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*,² a book shorter and more straightforwardly introductory in orientation. In both cases the intention will be to partially contrast Deleuze's somewhat more naturalist reading of Spinoza with Antonio Negri's more aggressively political interpretation of the development and significance of Spinoza's thought in ways subsequently developed in later collaborative work – in the case of Deleuze with Félix Guattari, in that of Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt, with reference to two of best known of those collaborative works by their respective authors, *A Thousand Plateaus*³ and *Empire*.⁴

Taking a cue from Perry Anderson's *Considerations on Western Marxism*,⁵ both Deleuze and Negri might be regarded as developing the perspective articulated by Althusser, in Althusser and Balibar's *Reading Capital*⁶ that 'Spinoza's philosophy introduced an unprecedented theoretical revolution in the history of philosophy, probably the greatest revolution of all time'.⁷ This claim, as Anderson himself points out, is far from original even in the history of the development of Marxism and, as we have already seen, the history of Spinoza's influence on subsequent thinking is present virtually from its inception. It also needs to be borne in mind that Ferdinand Alquié, Deleuze's own teacher and a specialist on Spinoza was probably as much or more of an influence on Deleuze than any general Althusserian tendency in French Marxist thinking in the post-war period.

One might also reference in this context Warren Montag's brief but helpful survey of the new direction taken by a number of French philosophers in the same period, though also by closely related philosophical perspectives such as those of Negri in his preface to Etienne Balibar's *Spinoza and Politics*.⁸ Montag refers his reader not only to Balibar's collaborative work with Althusser, and to Negri, but also to F. Matheron's

one of them on the last main page of the last essay (See Chapter 10: Pierre-Francois Moreau, 'Spinoza's Reception and Influence', p. 430). *The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) provides three references to Deleuze and none to Negri, although it might also be argued that in both cases this also says something about the nature of the approach to Spinoza's thought provided in these publications, even if, in the case of one of the essays in the latter (Andreas Schmidt, 'Substance Monism and Identity Theory in Spinoza'; op cit., pp. 79-98), Deleuze's use of Duns Scotus's distinction between *distinction realis* and, in particular, *distinctio formalis* plays a very substantial role in the essay's approach to the precise nature and significance of relations between substance and attributes in Spinoza's *Ethics*.

¹ Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, translated by Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992; originally published in 1968).

² Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, translated by Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988; originally published in 1970).

³ Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, translated by Brian Massumi (London: The Athlone Press, 1986; originally published in 1980).

⁴ Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

⁵ Perry Anderson, *Considerations on Western Marxism* (London: NLB, 1976).

⁶ Louis Althusser & Etienne Balibar, *Reading Capital*, translated by Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1997; originally published in 1968).

⁷ Althusser, p 102; as quoted in Anderson (1976), p. 64.

⁸ Warren Montag, introduction to Etienne Balibar, *Spinoza and Politics*, translated by Peter Snowdon (London: Verso, 1998; originally published in 1985), pp. vi-xix.

*Individu et communauté chez Spinoza*¹ and to Martial Gueroult's *Spinoza: Dieu, Ethique 1*² published, like Deleuze's *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, in 1968, and providing an extended, eight-hundred page reading on Part I of the *Ethics*. Gueroult's book, in Montag's view, was influential not so much in terms of developing the particular form of Marxist, historical-materialist emphasis in the reading of Spinoza partly initiated by Althusser and Balibar in *Reading Capital*'s allusions to Spinoza, as a reading so thorough that 'it appeared that no one before had really read Spinoza to the letter'.³

Pierre Macherey, in *Hegel ou Spinoza*,⁴ Antonio Negri, here in terms of the influence of the French translation of *The Savage Anomaly*⁵ in 1982 and, ultimately, Balibar in *Spinoza and Politics* (originally appearing as *Spinoza et la politique* in 1985) are all viewed by Montag as developing the significance of the political elements which become an increasing concern in Spinoza's philosophy as it develops. While our discussion here will only provide a brief comparison between elements of Deleuze and Negri's respective analyses of Spinoza's thinking, one might, nevertheless, take note of the closing phrase of *Spinoza and Politics*, made in relation to Spinoza's ultimate political significance as presented by Balibar (in the English of Peter Snowdon's later translation) in terms of – 'the democratisation of knowledge'⁶ – a concern particularly pertinent to a reader of the poetry of J.H. Prynne, however bizarre or perverse a claim that might sound to one accustomed to thinking of his poetry primarily in terms of its difficulty of access to the reader.

Deleuze's own philosophical thinking, which might in many senses be characterised as a post-war metaphysics of difference, though not without a more directly aggressive political dimension when in more direct relation with the more straightforward forms of political radicalism embodied in the approach of Félix Guattari, almost always evinces a strong interest in the relation of human to natural being, thus indicating a considerable affinity with, but by no means straightforwardly sympathetic attitude to, the thought of Heidegger, another clearly substantial and directly philosophical influence, along with Husserl and Marx, on twentieth century French philosophical thought.

At the same time, Deleuze is perhaps best known, at least in relation to the earlier stages of his work, for his particular approach to and development of Bergson's thought, in relation to Bergson's conceptualisation of multiplicity as well as, to a slightly lesser and perhaps to a less convincing extent, for his emphasis on the precise nature and significance of Nietzsche's revaluation of the foundations of ethical thinking. As Michael Hardt argues in a memorably lucid reading of Deleuze's relatively early monographs on Bergson, Nietzsche, and Spinoza,⁷ this phase of Deleuze's thinking develops an explicitly political dimension in the two studies of Spinoza published in 1968 and 1970 *Spinoza: Expressionism in Philosophy* and *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*. The slightly earlier, longer book is more academic and detailed in its precise analysis of particular

¹ F. Matheron, *Individu et communauté chez Spinoza* (Paris: Minuit, 1969).

² Martial Gueroult, *Spinoza: Dieu, Ethique 1* (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1968).

³ Montag in Balibar, *Spinoza and Politics*, p. xiii.

⁴ Pierre Macherey, *Hegel ou Spinoza* (Paris: Maspero, 1979).

⁵ Antonio Negri, *The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics*, translated by Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991; *L'anomalie sauvage* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982; *L'anomalia selvaggia. Saggio su potere e potenza in Baruch Spinoza* was originally published in 1981).

⁶ Balibar (1998), p. 124.

⁷ Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (London: UCL Press, 1993).

developments in Spinoza's philosophical method, partly since it formed one part of Deleuze's *doctorat d'état*, while the shorter book appears to constitute a rather more populist-oriented intervention in relation to the *événements* of 1968. While, as stated, primary focus here will be on the longer book, a few prefatory remarks on the shorter study in relation to its longer elder cousin will be in order.

In the longer *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* Deleuze particularly focuses on the development of what he views as the significant element of naturalism present in the post-Cartesian metaphysics of both Spinoza and Leibniz. In the shorter study, the focus is on specific terms related to Spinoza's philosophy but prefaced by an introductory essay which presents Spinoza as a philosophical rather than a political figure and makes regular comparisons with the subject of Deleuze's earlier study on Nietzsche. As the translator into English of the shorter study, Robert Hurley, observes in his preface to the book, the first word in the book is 'Nietzsche'¹ and the first full sentence is 'Nietzsche understood, having lived it himself, what constitutes the mystery of a philosopher's life'.² Deleuze, while generally expressing himself as an opponent of mystification in most forms of thinking and practice might be regarded as a more traditional philosopher, at least from a Marxist perspective, in the sense of being as interested in describing the world as in changing it. At the same time, Spinoza is partly presented in the short study as a somewhat mysterious figure partly due to the relative social solitude in which he was obliged to live but also, as in terms of Deleuze's considerably Nietzschean evocation of Spinoza, as figure of the philosopher, who in this respect elects to live in this socially removed fashion.

Deleuze quickly focuses, in the introductory phase of his shorter study, on the *milieu*, in the sense, in this context, of the particular social, but by extension, philosophical environment in which Spinoza found himself, one which is extended to the lives of all philosophers: 'he cannot integrate into any milieu even if it is in democratic and liberal milieus that he finds the best living conditions'.³ From the perspective of our discussion in the chapter of the present study, the language of this characterisation already begins to take on a partly environmental colouring. As with Kant, or Spinoza, there is a partly political emphasis on freedom, though it appears to be characterised less as a freedom to make moral choices and more as a Nietzschean freedom, the freedom gained from being left alone in conditions which allow one to develop one's philosophical thought and the expression of one's specific being as a philosophical thinker in relative freedom from moral, social or political interference.

The essential significance of Spinoza's thinking for Deleuze is partly emphasised at a slightly later stage in the short study in terms of a reference to Spinoza's conceptualisation of ethical joy as 'the correlate of speculative affirmation'.⁴ Active, creative thought in relation to feeling, rather than direct action, is focused upon, even if it can reasonably be claimed that the latter is implied by the former. What might be termed Deleuze's partly Bergsonian, partly Nietzschean, 'bio-ethical' tendencies are also indicated towards the end of the study as a whole, where Deleuze begins to relate 'Affective capacity'⁵ in Spinoza to Jakob von Uexküll's ethological approach to how art, or 'artifice' is always an element at work in nature, as in his famous example of the tick,

¹ Robert Hurley in Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, p. i.

² Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, p. 3.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 29.

⁵ Ibid., p. 124.

one which Deleuze will continue to deploy in his own subsequent work. Here a slightly extended quotation will serve to exemplify the attitude presented in relation to Spinoza in this respect:

Long after Spinoza, biologists and naturalists will try to describe the animal worlds defined by affects and capacities for affecting and being affected. For example, J. von Uexkull will do this for the tick, an animal that sucks the blood of mammals. He will define this animal by three affects: the first has to do with light (climb to the top of a branch); the second is olfactive (let yourself fall onto the animal that passes beneath the branch); and the third is thermal (seek the area without fur, the warmest spot) . . . Spinoza's ethics has nothing do with a morality; he conceives of it as an ethology, that is as a composition of slow and fast speeds, of capacities for affecting and being affected on the plane of immanence.¹

Here Deleuze can be found expressing an approach to nature, partly developed in relation to the analyses he had undertaken in his work prior to that on Spinoza in terms of philosophically conceiving of nature as a physics of forces and movement, in what Deleuze himself often presents as a form of underrated or even underground philosophical tradition which looked back to the Stoics, Lucretius, aspects of Duns Scotus and found its most powerful early modern expression in Spinoza.

The expressionist physics of nature thus characterised is explicated at length in the longer book on Spinoza, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* and a discussion of some aspects of the analysis of Spinoza's philosophical attitude that Deleuze presents there will be pertinent to our discussion here from a variety of perspectives. One of these, as stated earlier, is the greater emphasis which Deleuze places on Spinoza's naturalism, in comparison both to Negri's and many other readings of Spinoza. Another is the relation of Deleuze's own version of philosophical naturalism, as articulated in both of his books on Spinoza as well as in at least one of the later collaborations with Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*. The particular concern in the present study will be with the partial affinity, often remarked upon, of the approach of the later collaboration with Guattari, with the approach to relations between nature in general and human social systems developed by another theorist of human social and cultural behaviour, whose work was also informed by aspects of biological thinking, Niklas Luhmann, notably in his most famous work, *Social Systems*.²

A third perspective pertinent to the present study is Deleuze's own specific attempt at providing a more biologically naturalistic version of philosophical aesthetics, more overtly perhaps in *A Thousand Plateaus*, but with its beginnings in his studies of Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, Bergson, and, in certain respects, Spinoza. As partly indicated by the previously quoted passage from Deleuze's shorter book on Spinoza, the primary concern in our consideration of the longer book will be with Deleuze's particular focus on the nature and significance of a physics of forces, as presented in some respects in the later chapters of *Expressionism in Philosophy* and its analysis of Spinoza's consideration of relations between bodies, particularly in the *Ethics*, and it is to this longer study that we can now turn.

¹ Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, p. 129.

² Niklas Luhmann, *Social Systems*, translated by John Bednarz, Jr., with Dirk Baeker (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995; originally published in 1984).

The notion of expressionism in late seventeenth century philosophy, it should be pointed out, is not specific to Deleuze. In the context of nineteen-sixties' philosophical writing Louis Althusser summarises a basic distinction in some paragraphs from *Reading Capital*, published in the same year as *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, when he writes, in the context of what he considers to be the original nature of Marx's theoretical perspective:

Very schematically, we can say that classical philosophy (the existing Theoretical) had two and only two systems of concepts with which to think effectivity. The mechanistic system, Cartesian in origin, which reduced causality to a *transitive* and analytical effectivity: it could not be made to think the effectivity of a whole on its elements, except at the cost of extraordinary distortions (such as those in Descartes' 'psychology' and biology). But a second system was available, one conceived precisely to deal with the effectivity of a whole on its elements: the Leibnizian concept of *expression*. This is the model which dominates all Hegel's thought.¹

It is not the aim here to explore relations between Althusser's and Deleuze's notions of expressionism, though it might be argued that Leibniz was in many respects as much an influence on Hegel's thinking as that of Spinoza despite the more traditionally, less overtly immanent version of totality arguably presented in Leibniz's version of expressionism but the relevance of the remark to Deleuze's own struggle with the dominance of aspects of Hegelianism in the French philosophical context will in some respects emerge in our subsequent discussion both of Deleuze's and Negri's approach to Spinoza as well as that of the more apparently Althusser-influenced Michael Hardt, whose own treatment of Deleuze's reading of Spinoza will also subsequently be considered in this section of the chapter.

In the opening stages of *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* Deleuze situates Spinoza and his expressionism in terms of that longer tradition of philosophy previously referred to and in relation to implication: 'Expression in general involves and implicates what it expresses, while also explicating and involving it'.² Here is already expressed an at least partially implied relation to Leibniz by way of the very notion of implication, which will form part of a series of 'plications' explored at length in Deleuze's contemporaneous publication, *Difference and Repetition*³ and focused upon, much later in his career, in his relatively short meditation on Leibniz, *Le Pli*, or in English translation, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*,⁴ a book which forms Deleuze's last full-length study of a major philosopher, in the context of a general philosophical study of the nature and significance of the baroque, the latter itself an art-form strongly connected to a specific religious and, in some respects, political attitude if we choose to credit the interpretations provided both by Deleuze and by Antonio Negri.

The Baroque, as we shall see shortly, is not interpreted with the same degree of sympathetic probing by Negri, due to what he views as the ultimately politically (by

¹ Althusser & Balibar, *Reading Capital*, p. 206.

² Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, p. 16.

³ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994; originally published in 1968).

⁴ Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, translated by Tom Conley (London: The Athlone Press, 1993; originally published in 1988).

way of metaphysically) motivated nature of the mystifying aspects of Baroque complexities. Deleuze, by contrast, in *The Fold*, in *Difference and Repetition*, and in *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* embarks on an essentially positive reading of the complicating aspects of the Baroque, partially connecting them (as might be noted in relation to the subsequent discussion of Arran Gare's environmentally focused perspective on metaphysics considered later in this chapter) to the process philosophy of A.N. Whitehead, Negri, and his translator into English as well as later, collaborator, Michael Hardt.

Affinities between Spinoza and Leibniz are regularly observed in *Expressionism and Philosophy: Spinoza*, but so are some of the differences between the philosophical attitudes of the two thinkers, as the following sentence partly begins to indicate in terms of Spinoza's approach: 'Implication and explication, involution and evolution: terms inherited from a long philosophical tradition, always subject to the charge of pantheism'.¹ Spinoza is often viewed as the ultimate modern philosophical radical, particularly in socio-political terms, and thus understandably claimed by the more recent neo-Marxist politico-philosophical tradition as one of its major predecessors, but Deleuze is as keen to indicate the theological and, as the title of Spinoza's own book clearly and unambiguously expresses, ethical significance of the immanentist attitude to the nature of being expressed in the *Ethics* in particular, as well as by the notorious dictum, or double-definition for which Spinoza is perhaps best known – *deus sive natura*.² In this respect, in the introductory stage of his study, Deleuze makes the further observation in relation to Spinoza and Leibniz, that

Independently of one another the two philosophers seem to rely on the idea of expression. In order to overcome difficulties in Cartesianism, to restore a Philosophy of Nature, and even to incorporate Cartesian results in systems thoroughly hostile to Descartes's vision of the world.³

Part of Deleuze's interest in this respect seems to be in the synthesis of Cartesian mechanism and a subsequently developed, more biological organicism, present in different ways in aspects of both Spinoza's and Leibniz's respective philosophies. In terms of later developments, as typified by the philosopher usually considered as the father of modern philosophical vitalism, F.W.J. Schelling, Deleuze observes that 'postkantian philosophers might seem to have been well-placed to recognise the presence in Spinozism of that genetic movement of self-development for which they sought anticipations everywhere'⁴ and that even Schelling 'claimed to be following Boehme rather than Spinoza; it was in Boehme rather than in Spinoza or Leibniz that he claimed to have found the idea of expression'.⁵

At the same time, one might note that more recent studies of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, of which, from the perspective presented in the present study, Jennifer Mensch's *Kant's Organicism*⁶ constitutes a particularly informative and thought-provoking example, indicate how Kant was influenced by developing conceptualisations of epigenesis initially deriving from empirical scientific discoveries such as that made by

¹ Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, p. 16.

² See Spinoza, *Ethics*, Book IV, translated by Andrew Boyle and G.H.R. Parkinson (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1989; originally published in 1674), p. 142.

³ Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, p. 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Jennifer Mensch, *Kant's Organicism* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013).

Anton Leeuwenhoek, under the microscope in Holland in 1677, of spermatozoa – a discovery made in close to complete geographical and historical proximity to the development of the lens-grinding Spinoza’s philosophical approach. Mensch also indicates how Leibniz met briefly not only with Spinoza but also with Swammerdam and Leeuwenhoek, and how their scientific discoveries may well have influenced Leibniz’s own philosophical, if also somewhat more traditionally spiritual development of the notion of entelechies as later expressed in his *Monadology*.¹

The first half of Deleuze’s longer study of Spinoza is very much concerned with explicating the precise relation of the various elements and levels or, as we might say in Deleuze and Guattari’s own subsequent philosophical terminology in *A Thousand Plateaus*, ‘planes’ of being. By the second half of the book, however, and partly following the development of Spinoza own argumentation in the *Ethics*, Deleuze has become increasingly involved in Spinoza’s specific expression of the nature and relation of different ‘creatures’ and their apparent reduction to the status of ‘modes’. One of Deleuze’s principal aims in this respect might be seen as indicating how, far from reducing human freedom to some form of predestination, Spinoza’s primary philosophical focus is on expressing the interconnectedness of all forms of being in a manner by means of which the realisation of connections between them, from a very limited awareness to, in principle, a perfect awareness, allows them to express the power or potential of their own, always to some extent limited, form of being.

In this respect, Deleuze has already emphasised the importance of two levels of expression: ‘the first level of expression must be understood as the very constitution, a genealogy almost, of the essence of substance. The second must be understood as the very production of particular things’.² The vocabulary of Deleuze’s articulation of the first level of expression once more has a somewhat Nietzschean, or even Foucauldian, ring to it in terms of philosophical deployments of the notion of ‘genealogy’, although the distinction as observed in relation might also be viewed as subsequently developed in various ways by a series of major nineteenth-century German thinkers, from Kant, Schelling and Hegel through to Heidegger’s conceptions of the ontological and the ontic in the first half of the twentieth century.

One of Deleuze’s aims at this early, introductory stage of his analysis in *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* is to indicate his own reading of Spinoza’s distinction between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* in terms of ‘the new Naturalism’: ‘God expresses himself in himself “before” expressing himself in his effects: expresses himself by in himself constituting *natura naturans*, before expressing himself through producing within himself *natura naturata*’.³ Here the move seems to be towards an explanatory physics, but also, as Deleuze indicates a few chapters later, towards a conception of freedom as freedom from ignorance, as perhaps distinct in certain respects from Kant’s arguably greater ethical emphasis on freedom as the freedom to make meaningful, consciously unselfish moral decisions, itself a position arguably somewhat closer to that of Leibniz’s more conscious decision to retain a significant element of traditional Christian theology in his own metaphysical approach. The difference in philosophical and ethical stance in this respect is one which might be viewed as partially comparable to the problems which Juergen Habermas has with what he perceives to be the ethical

¹ See Mensch, *Kant’s Organicism*, p. 29, for the relevant citation from Leibniz’s text.

² Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, p. 14.

³ *Ibid.*

implications of Niklas Luhmann's approach in his version of social systems theory, a perspective to be considered at a later stage in this chapter.

Deleuze's ultimate goal, as perceived through the particular discursive perspective of the reading provided in the present study, is more clearly to explicate relations between the modes, freedom, and power in Spinoza's philosophical approach. In the course of doing so Deleuze considers Spinoza's specific reading of the problem of Adam and the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden. In Spinoza's 'naturalist' reading, Adam makes the mistake, one made, from Spinoza's perspective, by most traditional theology, of presuming that when God warns of the dangerous consequences of eating the fruit he is providing him with a sign to be taken as a moral commandment, rather than as a way of adding to his knowledge, thus lessening his ignorance and consequent power to act more effectively. In this respect, and with this focus on Spinoza's approach to the ethics of knowledge, Deleuze can be viewed as focusing primarily on the significance of the attributes as natural rather than metaphysical in a more traditionally mystical, transcendent sense, and it is in this context that he cites Spinoza's deployment of a passage from Saint Paul to support this perspective, also quoting, in the same context, a passage in Spinoza's later *Political Treatise* "The invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made . . ." ¹ The univocity of attributes merges with their expressivity: attributes are, indissolubly, expressive and univocal'. ²

The problem broached here can be seen as having as much, or more, to do with the nature of Spinoza's naturalist approach to creative being in comparison with Leibniz's closely related conception of 'sufficient reason' as it has to do with a rejection of the relevant aspects of more traditional forms of theology. Relations between adequate knowledge and effective power are developed in Deleuze's reading of Spinoza in this respect in ways which have strong affinities with Negri's more deliberately Marxist reading of the Dutch philosopher but also, it can be argued, with Luhmann's integration of Maturana and Varela's, considerably epigeneticist, notions of autopoiesis into his particular version of systems theory.

One of the more dramatic elements in Deleuze's longer book on Spinoza, and perhaps of Spinoza's *Ethics*, is its conception of relations between bodies, which begins to be addressed directly in the fourteenth chapter of *Expressionism in Philosophy*, 'What Can a Body Do?' This chapter, too, is substantially characterised by regular comparisons with Leibniz. The nature and significance of the body in Spinoza is partly presented through a conceptualisation of relations between bodies in which one body's capacity to be affected by other bodies is paramount. This leads Spinoza, in Deleuze's reading, to pose two crucial questions: 'What is the structure (fabrica) of a body? And: What can a body do? A body's structure is the composition of its relation. What a body can do corresponds to the nature and capacity of its capacity to be affected'. ³ Like Negri later, Deleuze makes much of Spinoza's distinction between *potentia* and *potestas*, if in a somewhat different fashion. For Deleuze in the present context the distinction partly relates to that between the passions and the affections in Spinoza:

¹ Spinoza, *Tractatus politicus*, iv.11.114; see Deleuze (1992), p. 358, note 10.

² Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, p. 59.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

An affection is not a passion, except when it can be explained by the nature of the affected body: it then of course involves the body, but is explained by the influences of other bodies. Affections that can be explained by the nature of an affected body are active affections, and themselves actions.¹

A distinction between negative affections, or passions and positive, active affections with positive potential rather than the capacity to be primarily negatively affected, is established. This distinction in turn leads us to the “ethical” question, properly so called² in Spinoza’s philosophy: can existing finite modes attain to active affections and, if so, how?

Deleuze moves on to consider how Leibniz reaches a substantially similar conclusion but in a way which, perhaps for reasons essentially connected to theologico-political diplomacy, appears to collude in a misrepresentation of the significance both of Spinoza’s thinking in this respect and perhaps of the true nature of Leibniz’s own thinking. In this context Deleuze more explicitly claims of Leibniz that: ‘His criticism of a generalized Spinozism is skilful: but one cannot be sure that Leibniz himself subscribed to it (for how then could he so have admired Spinoza’s theory of action and passion in modes)³ and goes on to insist that ‘what is clear, at any rate, is that everything in Spinoza’s work resists such an interpretation’.⁴ At the same time, Deleuze continues to present Spinoza and Leibniz as sharing ‘a common project’ in relation to the establishment of a new form of naturalism. As in the approach of the Australian cultural philosopher Arran Gare, who deploys the somewhat different philosophical perspective of Vico in a partially comparable anti-Cartesian modality, Deleuze focuses on this ‘common project’ in terms of its opposition to ‘a mathematical science whose first effect was to devalue Nature by taking away from it any virtuality or potentiality, any inherent being’.⁵

An essential difference between Spinoza and Leibniz is then immediately focused upon by Deleuze. Leibniz’s philosophical evocation of an expressive Nature is articulated in terms of a hierarchy of symbols which are ultimately harmonised in the terms of a closed system, a God who can include the new mechanistic approach into his ultimately traditional theological being. In Spinoza, by contrast, ‘mechanism is referred to something deeper, but this through the requirement of an absolutely immanent, pure causality’.⁶ In this respect we seem to be closer to the kind of open system characterised by Luhmann’s systems theory as well as aspects of Arran Gare’s subsequent characterisation of the kind of process philosophy initiated by both Whitehead and Bergson, each of them, like Leibniz, sympathetic to incorporating some form of traditional Christian notion of spirituality into their respective philosophical approaches.

A comparable comparison and contrast is provided by Deleuze in broader terms in the concluding part of *Expressionism in Philosophy* which particularly focuses on how

¹ Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, pp. 218-219.

² *Ibid.*, p. 219.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

Spinoza develops expressionism in a more precise sense than Leibniz and ‘strictly opposes expressions to signs or analogies’,¹ the latter approach viewed by Deleuze as being deployed by Leibniz in terms of a ‘*philosophy of equivocal expressions* aimed at averting the dangers of pantheism’.² Spinoza is once more characterised in partially Nietzschean terms as willing to accept the risks of that danger and of committing himself to the consequences of the fall of the dice as presented in Deleuze’s earlier study of the later philosopher for whom Spinoza was always a figure of primary significance in metaphysical terms:³ ‘Spinoza accepts the truly philosophical “danger” of immanence and pantheism implicit in the notion of expression. Indeed, he throws in his lot with that danger’.⁴

Deleuze, as presented in this brief consideration of aspects of his work on Spinoza, thus presents us with a project relating to a naturalist metaphysics, more radical and immanent in approach than that of Leibniz, but quite closely comparable to it, and at the same time, focuses on a relatively technical philosophical reading of Spinoza’s philosophy of relations between bodies and their component elements. Having made this observation, I propose now to turn to the second perspective on Spinoza’s philosophical and political project to be considered in this study, the quite closely related, but more explicitly political reading of Spinoza provided in Antonio Negri’s *The Savage Anomaly*.⁵

Antonio Negri on Spinoza

THE ‘dangerous’ aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy, as we have already observed, is part of his attraction, and fundamental significance, in a political sense, to more explicitly Marxist readings of his work. If this is the most obvious point of difference between Negri’s reading of Spinoza and that of Deleuze, attention might be drawn, before proceeding further, to some of the very few criticisms of Deleuze’s analysis explicitly articulated in *The Savage Anomaly*, more often than not in footnotes rather than in the main text.

Apart from his problem with Deleuze ‘having insisted too much on the analogies between Spinoza and Leibniz’⁶ Negri observes Deleuze’s failure to postulate an ‘an internal interruption’ to Spinoza’s philosophical system – a crucial aspect of Negri’s own reading – and, thirdly, at least partly rejects Deleuze’s characterisation of the nature of Spinoza’s move from a philosophical emanationism to an immanentism, as displayed in the ‘expressionism’ on which Deleuze focuses in terms of philosophical relations between substance, essence, attributes, and modes. As Negri states in the concluding sentence of this footnote ‘It seems to me that this route does not arrive at the ontological inversion that I find so important in Spinoza’.⁷

A significant aspect of Negri’s reading of Spinoza’s approach to philosophy is that the nature of the thinking produced is so powerful that not only is the thinker far from

¹ Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, p. 328.

² *Ibid.*, p. 329.

³ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (London: The Athlone Press, 1983; originally published in 1962).

⁴ Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, p. 333.

⁵ Antonio Negri, *Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics*, translated by Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991; originally published in 1981).

⁶ Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, p. 251 (endnote 44).

⁷ *Ibid.*

in control in developing his philosophical system but also that a particularly significant rupture occurs during at least one stage of that development. A whole chapter, 'Interruption of the System' is devoted to this creative rupture in Spinoza's philosophical approach as characterised by Negri. Comparison is made with aspects of Shakespeare in a form of allusion which itself might be viewed as indicating affinities with Harold Bloom's Freudian and Paglia's even more specifically sexual reading of the nature of creative thought in this respect.

The figure on whom Negri focuses in this context is referred to by Spinoza in a letter of 1664 to Peter Balling where Spinoza writes of waking from 'a very deep dream' mentally possessed by 'the image of a certain, black scabby Brazilian whom I had never seen before' and which, Negri further relates by way of summary, 'would not immediately leave his mind, despite his attempts to remove it by focusing on other objects within his field of vision'.¹ Negri characterises this half-waking imaginative encounter as 'the Caliban problem – that is the liberatory force of the natural imagination', one which he views as being 'located within the highest abstraction of philosophical meditation'.² Despite Negri's considerably negative attitude towards what he characterises as a post-Rousseauvian conceptual tradition of freedom that includes Kant, his characterisation of the relation of 'the natural imagination'³ to political liberation can nevertheless also be argued to indicate considerable affinity with Peter Cascardi's location of a more radically liberal aspect to Kant's very late thought and his reflections on the significance of the feeling expressed by ordinary people in the context of the French Revolution in relation to the development of Kant's notion of the *sensus communis aestheticus*, that is to say, a notion of freedom connected to that of the full expression of the body and the senses, one explicitly embraced by Marx in his early thinking, as in Lefebvre's allusion, referred to earlier, to his aspiration 'for the senses theoreticians in their own right',⁴ an attitude which itself might be seen as partly connecting aspects of radically liberal political thinking to those of aesthetics in ways which emerge in various forms during the twentieth century.

Negri, partly working in an Italian tradition of philosophy, presents aspects of Spinoza's thinking as a development of perspectives already substantially forged by both Niccolò Machiavelli and Giordano Bruno and specifically alludes to the work of the renowned English scholar of Renaissance mysticism, Frances Yates, in relation to Bruno, in the opening pages of his book.⁵ Like Deleuze, but in rather more detail and with a different, more explicitly radical, political emphasis, he also seeks to situate Spinoza in what he considers to be his precise socio-historical environment, that of a late seventeenth century Holland which in its own radical modernity, particularly as expressed or embodied in Amsterdam, had 'assumed the dimensions of accumulation on a world scale'.⁶ The emphasis is thus, rather as in Williams's *The Country and the City*, more fully on the way in which socio-political developments are expressed through imaginative thinking, in this case in philosophical form.

¹ Spinoza, Letter 17 to Peter Balling, cited in Negri (1991), p. 86.

² Negri, *The Savage Anomaly*, p. 86.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

⁵ See Frances Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964); as cited in Negri, *The Savage Anomaly*, p. 7.

⁶ Negri, *The Savage Anomaly*, p. 7.

A major element in Negri's reading of Spinoza is through the relation of two forms of power, those of *potentia* and *potestas* (to be characterised in greater detail shortly) in the context of what is characterised as the developing ideology of the market in connection with the increasing totalitarianism of science. This can be viewed as an interpretive stance at least partially comparable with that of Andrew Bowie, if presented in more radically dramatized political language. As with Deleuze in a more strictly philosophical fashion, Negri's more politico-philosophical quarrel is particularly with notions of 'mediation'. In this respect, he argues, 'the real concept of *potentia* constitutes the only mediation, a mediation internal to being, and therefore not a mediation at all but a form of the tension, of the life of being'.¹ Here again, it can be suggested, we are presented with an organic, conceptual characterisation of a form of epigenesis, if expressed in aggressively direct political terms.

Negri provides his own detailed and dramatic reading of the development in Spinoza's thought from the early work and the first half of the *Ethics*, through the interruption provided by the writing and implications of the *Theologico-Political Treatise*, to the later stages of the *Ethics* and the *Political Treatise*. It is in the *Theologico-Political Treatise*, Negri argues, that it becomes clear that 'Politics is the metaphysics of the imagination, the metaphysics of the human constitution of reality, the world'.² This politics essentially takes the form of an opposition of the real power or *potentia* of the human imagination to the *potestas* or exploitative power of inadequately conceived and constituted human societies. Much of the history of political thought and practice, from the period of the Baroque through to Rousseau, in many respects, and beyond, including 'Spinozism' so-called, is, in Negri's reading, indicative of the complicity of much post-Spinozan thinking with *potestas* in this respect.

Negri links his attack on mediation to one on Spinozism at this stage of his argument, as the following passage from his book indicates in characteristically aggressive terms:

In Spinozism, in the ideology of the market, in the totalitarianism of science, it is impossible to maintain the freedom of *potentia* and its irreducibility to the dialectical process of mediation. Spinoza then (the Spinoza that is mutilated and translated into Spinozism) is reduced to Rousseau; and, in turn, Marx (and the discovery of the class struggle as foundation of the crisis of the market) is corralled and butchered, similarly brought down to Rousseau; even Rousseau himself is shredded in the rough material of the capitalist necessity to mystify *potentia* in *potestas*.³

Negri might reasonably be regarded as involved, in terms of passages like this, in political polemics, at least by comparison with the more restrained tones of Deleuze's analysis but, as previously observed, and as will be indicated by subsequent citations, the somewhat Romantic emphasis placed upon the imagination can be seen as crucial to Negri's rhetoric and philosophical approach to Spinoza's approach to human beings' relations to each other, to nature, and to the nature of freedom as conceived.

Negri directly relates Spinoza's approach to truth in the later parts of the *Ethics* to freedom as characterised but also in terms of Spinoza's conception of relations between *appetitus*, *cupiditas*, and *conatus*, in terms of a form of dynamically constitutive striving

¹ Negri, *The Savage Anomaly*, p. 44.

² *Ibid.*, p. 97.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

in relation to the affects and a productive force conceived of as a force of nature, particularly in its form as human nature, which is ultimately opposed to a limitation of that power by an appropriative minority, of the kind represented in the work of Thomas Hobbes, as a necessary alternative to the destructive anarchy, that from the latter's philosophical perspective, nature almost invariably constitutes if left to itself. It is in this context that Negri once more evokes the figure of Shakespeare:

To me Spinoza more profoundly evokes Shakespeare, a dramatic arrangement that does not assume meanings from the outside, but rather internally produces the dramatic form or the logical conflict as an expression of its own power, as a demonstration of a revolutionary and independent connection to the earth – in Spinoza's case, a power that is taken as a prefiguration of liberation.¹

Like Deleuze, Negri sees the philosophical passage of metaphysics into politics as 'dangerous' and, as in Deleuze, the revolutionary potential of Spinoza's conception of 'common notions' among bodies is emphasised: 'if two come together and unite their strength, they have jointly more power, and consequently right over nature, than either of them and the more there be that join in alliance, the more right they will collectively possess'.²

This extract from the *Political Treatise* would seem to articulate the kind of aggressively antagonistic politics Negri seeks to extract from Spinoza's dramatically and dynamically developed metaphysics as much as from his directly political philosophy. The element of physics in its constitution is appealed to in terms of its expression of the force(s) of nature in contrast to the 'Hobbes-Rousseau-Hegel'³ tradition of thinking which Negri also characterises as a form of 'Legalistic positivism'.⁴ In Spinoza, Negri claims, 'civil society and the political State are completely woven together, as inseparable moments of association and antagonism produced in constitution'.⁵ This claim is further developed, again primarily in relation to a reading of the opening chapters of the *Political Treatise*, which offers, in Negri's reading:

(a conception of the State that radically denies its transcendence – that is, a demystification of politics; (2) determination of Power (potestas) as a function subordinated to the social power (potentia) of the multitude and, therefore, constitutionally organised; (3) a conception of constitution, in other words of constitutional organisation, which necessarily starts from the antagonism of subjects.⁶

If one compares the whole of Deleuze's and Negri's readings of Spinoza in their respective books the conclusions reached are compatible but divergent in nature. Deleuze, as we have already observed, emphasises the liberating direct nature of Spinoza's philosophically immanentist characterisation of nature without such a forceful assertion of the significance of politics as the immediately antagonistic outcome of the metaphysics of nature expressed, but the difference between the two readings would

¹ Negri, *The Savage Anomaly*, p. 142.

² Spinoza, cited in Negri, p. 194.

³ Negri, *The Savage Anomaly*, p. 200.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

seem to be primarily one of emphasis rather than fundamental orientation: Deleuze emphasises nature, Negri politics. Negri's conclusion to his own study emphasises the significance of social and political emancipation as 'the weaving together of plural ethically motivated human activity with the power of being presented in its givenness and determination'¹ and thereby to 'the multiplicity of affirmations that rise up out of the unlimited affability of the infinite. In Spinoza we find the pleasure of the infinite being, the pleasure of the world'.²

The appeal made here, in at least one sense, is to something broached in the early work of Marx and partly referred to in Cascardi's approach to the political implications of Kant's late aesthetics – partly via the work of Laclau, Mouffe, and Žižek, the ultimate sensuality of fully politically emancipated discourse expressed in relation to notions of pleasure, enjoyment and desire. Žižek's, and, to a lesser extent, Laclau and Mouffe's, notion of pleasure is more obviously 'mediated', in terms of its at least provisional status of an immediately unrealisable form of psychological 'fantasy' in Žižek's work and in the incorporation of a more overtly divided subject in the closely related politics of Laclau and Mouffe. In this respect, Negri seems closer to his occasional co-author Félix Guattari and to Deleuze in his emphasis on Spinoza's rather than Hegel's or Lacan's account of the relation of the human to the natural in the context of the development of an emancipatory politics; the roles of mediation and alienation will in fact make a return in our discussion in terms of the literary-ecological perspective of Andrew McMurry.

¹ Negri, *The Savage Anomaly*, p. 220.

² *Ibid.*

Michael Hardt on Deleuze on Spinoza

AT this stage in this discussion of aspects of Deleuze's and Negri's respective readings of Spinoza, it will now be helpful to consider some aspects of Michael Hardt's, partly Negri-influenced, reading of Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, in the form of devoting some attention to the second half of Hardt's *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*.¹ One of Hardt's main concerns in his reading of Deleuze's philosophical project is to indicate ways in which Deleuze negotiates the problem of how to escape the role of the negative in what is regarded as Hegel's significantly less materialistic and less open form of metaphysical speculation and its social and political implications. Crucial in this respect is Hardt's reading of the different notion of difference that he views as being developed in relation to Hegel's dialectical reading of Spinoza in terms of the emphasis placed upon the negative determinate significance of 'omnis determinatio est negatio' in contrast to the reading of the significance of that phrase provided by Deleuze. It can be noted in this context that Hardt's reading of Deleuze's approach to Spinoza focuses on the latter's slightly less familiar use of the expression, 'non opposita sed diversa' in relation to the rather more familiar 'omnis determinatio est negatio'. Hardt's approach, it can be further remarked, also bears an interesting relation to the biologically influenced concepts of epigenesis and autopoiesis as approached by Kant and Luhmann respectively.

Prior to this stage of his analysis, Hardt has already introduced us to what he considers to be the most important characteristics of Deleuze's philosophical 'apprenticeship' in terms of the way in which Deleuze deploys aspects of mediaeval scholasticism, particularly, through the approach implied by *pars construens*, *pars destruens*² and the specific form of ethically focused materialism he discovers, first in ontological terms, not only in Duns Scotus and in the work of Bergson but also, by way of a more aggressive ethical focus, in Nietzsche. Central to much of Hardt's approach in these respects is the notion, essentially derived from Bergson, and not unrelated to epigenesis, or Varela's conception of autopoiesis as developed from a sociological perspective by Luhmann, of difference as self-generated. This perspective finds a more precisely social articulation, however, in Hardt's reading of Spinoza in *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*. First citing a sentence from this book – "Spinoza's ontology is dominated by the notion of a *cause of itself, in itself and through itself*."³ Hardt goes on to observe that, for Deleuze, in Spinoza

This internal causal dynamic is what animates the real distinction of being. This is the absolutely positive difference that both supports being in itself and provides the basis for all the differences that characterise real being. To this extent, there is a positive correspondence between Bergson's difference of nature and Spinoza's real distinction: '*Non opposita sed diversa*' is the formula of the new logic. Real distinction appeared to open up a new conception of the negative, free from opposition and privation.⁴

¹ Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (London: UCL Press, 1993).

² *Ibid.*, p. xiii.

³ Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, p. 162; as cited in Hardt, p. 62.

⁴ Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, p. 60; as cited in *ibid.*

This formula and its implications lead Hardt to derive from Deleuze's reading a conceptualisation of the 'singularity of being, in that being is absolutely infinite and indivisible at the same time that it is distinct and determinate'.¹ It should perhaps also be observed that Hardt spends a good deal of time in the early stages of his book outlining the problem faced by Deleuze of how to escape the closed circle of Hegelian ontology in a manner reminiscent of Althusser's approach to the problem, as negotiated by Marx, of how to escape from the ideological closed space provided, as Althusser puts it in *Reading Capital*, by 'The whole history of the 'theory of knowledge' from 'the Cartesian circle' to the circle of the Hegelian or Husserlian teleology of Reason'.²

After further discussion of the ways in which Deleuze connects aspects of the formal distinction as presented in the philosophy and theology of Duns Scotus as well as in the role of the attributes in Spinoza's *Ethics*, and the relation of both to a positive, productive, and affirmative speculative philosophy, as distinct from that of Hegel, the role of power in relation to affections is highlighted, in a fashion arguably as close to that of Negri as that of Deleuze: 'Spinoza's conception of power is not only a principle of action, Deleuze claims, but also, to the same extent a principle of affected'.³ This claim is highlighted by Hardt as a connection which Deleuze himself emphasises through the corresponding connection he had identified between Spinoza and Nietzsche in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. The relation between actions and passions, or, in relation to that distinction, that between passive affections and active affections in Spinoza is relatively open but allows for the potential for a movement towards positive, productive affections and actions. Deleuze's approach to the significance of parallelism in Spinoza's philosophy is subsequently investigated by Hardt through consideration of objections from the perspective of Althusser's approach to the problem of developing practice from speculation, with Hardt emphasising the significance of the parallel roles of mind and body in Deleuze's reading of the *Ethics*.

Moving towards a characterisation of the precise significance of common notions in Spinoza, in terms of Deleuze's focus on the precise potential of the body as indicated in our consideration of the relevant parts of *Expressionism in Philosophy, Spinoza*, and introducing the more Negrian-sounding term of 'constitution' in doing so ('Common notions are not primarily a speculative form of analysis, but a practical tool of constitution'),⁴ Hardt, like Negri, focuses particularly upon the significance of the imagination, albeit as a form of 'the first kind of knowledge' as presented in the *Ethics*, 'the first kind (imagination, opinion, and revelation), the second kind (reason), and the third kind (intuition)'⁵ in terms of a partly indeterminate, ambiguous form of knowing and feeling, which while ranked relatively low in Spinoza's hierarchical or developmental stages of knowledge, has a specific potential which is related to its situation in the context of a parallelism between mind and body and the concept of an 'assemblage of composable relationships'⁶ driven by the motor of the *conatus*:

¹ Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, p. 63.

² Althusser & Balibar, *Reading Capital*, p. 57.

³ Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, p. 72.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

. . . while all of the ideas of the first kind may be true, the imagination is distinguished from opinion and revelation because an idea that arises from the material field of imagination gives indications of its cause. The imagination not only may be true, but, through the indication of its cause, it *may be adequate*.¹

In this respect, in a reading of Spinoza which in certain respects is increasingly in the process of becoming Hardt's own as much as that of Deleuze or Negri, common notions are characterised as the 'building blocks that arise on the terrain of the imagination' and thus produce 'what Deleuze calls a "curious harmony" between the imagination and reason'.² The 'reason' which emerges as 'the second kind of knowledge' in the *Ethics* is then, in Hardt's reading of Deleuze's Spinoza, viewed as 'an intensified imagination that has gained the power to sustain its imagining by means of the construction of the common notion'.³ Combining elements of the philosophical language of both Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*, Hardt thus concludes, at this stage in his discussion, that 'Reason is the imagination that returns, the refrain',⁴ a phrasing we shall revisit, in certain respects, both in this chapter and the later discussions of the more literary writers with which this book as a whole is concerned.

Hardt continues to develop his particular reading of the way in which Deleuze offers the possibility of a philosophically coherent approach to social and political practice which, unlike that of Hegel, and ultimately, Althusser, does not subsume the practical into the theoretical. In this respect Hardt observes that 'The movement of a Hegelian practice is always recuperated within the logic of order, dictated from above, whereas a Deleuzian practice rises from below through an open logic of organisation'⁵ If this sounds a little like a hymn to the soviets of the Russian Revolution, Hardt's preceding paragraph refers us precisely to 'a practical act, such as the 1917 Bolshevik insurrection'⁶ where it is not elements of Marxist theory that will provide the explanation for such an event but 'the common notion that transformed the joyful passions of the revolutionary into actions'.⁷

The final section of Hardt's chapter on 'Spinozian Practice' articulates a position closely proximate to that provided in Negri's analysis and one further developed in the collaborative work of Hardt and Negri, though, as Hardt indicates, also clearly emphasised in Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, in the following citation from *Expression in Philosophy: Spinoza*: 'The law of nature is no longer referred to a final perfection but to the initial desire, to the strongest 'appetite'.⁸ Deleuze is, of course, by no means the only philosopher associated with post-Nietzschean, post-Freudian and post-structuralist perspectives on the relation of desire and *appetitus* to social, moral and political considerations and organisation but Hardt emphasises in the introduction to his book that a basic, constitutive, problem for post-structuralism in his reading of that descriptive term is the political significance of an affirmative approach to ontological questions,

¹ Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, p. 102.

² *Ibid.*, p. 103.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Deleuze, *Spinoza: Expressionism in Philosophy*, p. 259; as cited in *ibid.*, p. 108.

and those of theory and practice, which provides an effective alternative to Hegelianism.

The precise nature of the approach to a non-teleological reading of ‘nature’ provided in this respect involves, as in Negri, a strong, and in the case of Deleuze, considerable, emphasis on the positive significance of *appetitus* and its further development in terms of relations between bodies, and particularly in relation to the composition and positive constitution of human society and politics in further relation to theories of natural right at the time Spinoza was producing his own approach. One comes very close at this stage of Hardt’s approach to Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, to Negri’s interpretation of the significance of the difference between *potens* and *potestas*, partly in terms of ‘organization versus order’¹ and the succeeding allusion to Machiavelli.

At the same time, Hardt, in his readings both of Spinoza and of Deleuze focuses on the significance of a ‘devalorization’ in this respect, going back to the question of relations between bodies, through the relevant conceptualisations of *appetitus* and *conatus*, in an expressive relation to being which becomes antagonistic to the social order, in somewhat Rousseauian fashion, one might argue, though Hardt and Negri’s specific politico-philosophical antagonism to aspects of Rousseau are more explicitly articulated in the later collaboration with Negri, *Empire*.² In the present context Hardt highlights a dynamic of ‘perseverance’³ as ethical task in terms of our *conatus* presenting a natural, expressive challenge to the limits placed on us by the restrictions of a given social order and proceeds to assert that ‘This ethical perseverance is the open expression of multiplicity. Spinoza’s conception of natural right . . . poses the freedom from order, the freedom of multiplicity, the freedom of a society in anarchy’.⁴

Regardless of whether this claim is ‘legitimate’, on the part of any of the thinkers involved, or how acceptable a given reader might find it, the focus here is on Spinoza’s own focus, as interpreted by Deleuze, on ‘the increase of our power from natural to civil right’⁵ through living in a state of nature which involves, in Deleuze’s words, ‘the art of organizing encounters’⁶. Deleuze’s reading is, however, presented as having its own limitations in terms of turning theory into practice, one which again relates that problem to the process of ‘giving body to the process of political assemblage’.⁷

Hardt’s conclusions to his discussion of the relevant aspects of Deleuze’s earlier analysis provide us with a synoptic focus on what he considers to be the most significant, related, elements in Deleuze’s early philosophical development, those of ‘ontology, affirmation, practice, and constitution’⁸ with further emphasis on the move, in Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, from the Hegelian, or related Heideggerian position ‘with regard to positivity and its materialism’⁹ in terms of ontological speculation, from “*omnis determinatio est negatio*” to “*non opposita sed diversa*” – from negation to

¹ Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, p. 108.

² Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). As with Arran Gare and Niklas Luhmann, subsequent publications by this pairing are not taken into consideration in the present study.

³ Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, p. 109.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*, p. 262; as cited in Hardt, p. 110.

⁷ Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, p. 111.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

difference'.¹ Furthermore, Hardt himself emphasises the significance of materialism as he characterises it, as related to a critique of critical philosophy, partly supplied by his analysis of Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche in this respect, in the second main chapter of *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, 'Nietzschean Ethics', but primarily 'understood as a polemical position that combats any priority afforded to thought over matter, to mind over body, not in order to invert that relationship and give matter the same privilege, but rather to establish an equality between the two realms'.² Related concerns, as we shall see, are negotiated with particular focus in the poetry of Charles Olson, and arguably even more precisely, in that of J.H. Prynne.

The relation of a positive ontology to an ethics and politics involved in 'the concept of affirmation'³ is further rehearsed by Hardt as one where the Deleuzian form of philosophical negation is distinguished from that of modern critical and idealist philosophies, in the sense that Deleuze's 'affirmative philosophy does not refuse or ignore the power of the negative . . . but rather points towards a different concept of negation – a negation that opens the field of affirmation'.⁴ At the same time, a speculative form of philosophical affirmation can never be enough in itself. Citing a pertinent passage from Deleuze's own analysis, Hardt concludes that 'The affirmation of speculation must, then, be complemented by the joy of practice'.⁵

Moving through retrospective consideration of Deleuze's reading of relations between levels of adequacy of knowledge and those between sad and joyful passive affections and then active and then joyful passions in relation to sad and joyful encounters in further relation to communication between bodies in the form of common notions, Hardt also reaches a further conclusion to his section on affirmation in his claim, based on the positions of both Spinoza and Deleuze, that 'The practice of joy is the construction of ontological assemblages, and thus the constitution of being'.⁶ This claim in turn leads Hardt to further consider the political implications of post-structuralism as introduced in the opening stages of his book and its immediately connected concern: 'What can we make of Deleuze?'⁷ in terms of the ability of such a reading to provide 'a dynamic conception of democratic society as open, horizontal, and collective'.⁸

In relation to this version of political potential Hardt further develops his articulation of the nature of ontological, ethical and, particularly, social and political, organisation: 'by organisation I understand a continual process of composition and decomposition through social encounters on an immanent field of forces'.⁹ It is, however, only at the very end of his analysis and related set of socio-politically oriented conclusions that Hardt subsequently introduces an implied minor criticism of Deleuze, one that, to some extent, will be extended and developed in *Empire*: 'What Deleuze gives us, in effect, is a general orientation that can suggest the paths of future research into the

¹ Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, p. 114.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121.

contemporary forms of social assemblage'.¹ Both Deleuze himself, and perhaps in certain respects Spinoza, it might be claimed, end up being included in what is, at this stage the barely discernible criticism of the tendency towards speculative rather than practical philosophy, as versions of St. John, prefiguring and announcing the coming of the true, in this case, communist, Messiah and promised land, a tendency further developed in Hardt's approach in his book on Deleuze and even more explicitly articulated, in certain respects in *Empire*, or at least in its closing stages.

Rather than pursue this, in any case debatable, point in relation to Hardt's early monograph, and partly since it will be further addressed later in relation to *Empire*, I now propose to move to the provision of a very brief consideration of elements of the socio-spatial dimensions of modern European culture as presented in aspects of Deleuze, Negri, and Hardt's philosophico-political projects in terms of their later collaborative work, Deleuze's with the somewhat more radically-oriented Marxism and related psychoanalytical approach provided by Félix Guattari, in *A Thousand Plateaus* and Hardt and Negri's in *Empire*.

Deleuze and Guattari: *A Thousand Plateaus* (1986)

IN *A Thousand Plateaus*, the second volume of the 'Capitalism and Schizophrenia' project of which *Anti-Oedipus* constitutes the first volume,² the notion of a self-consciously carnivalesque, anti-authoritarian approach to contemporaneously current conditions of social subjectivisation is, in certain respects, explored in broader if perhaps marginally less rhetorically aggressive (though no less carnivalesque) manner than in the first volume. The work as a whole can be argued to remain somewhat institutionally academic in the sense that its style would seem to reproduce a form of discursive opacity that one might associate both with aspects of theoretical Western Marxism, as critically referenced in Perry Anderson's monograph, *Considerations on Western Marxism*, briefly referred to earlier, or, in the French context in the psychoanalytically based approach of Jacques Lacan and related forms of French 'theory' to problems concerning human subjectivity. As with, for example, the work of Slavoj Žižek, there is, at the same time, an equally apparent attempt on the part of Deleuze and Guattari to engage a broader audience than that of their immediate academic colleagues in what in many ways is a very specifically French articulation of the tradition of polemical, anti-authoritarian rhetoric and, as observed earlier, once closely related to that of the S.I. and related groups emerging in the period between the end of World War II and 1968. In very general terms, it might be claimed that the overall aim of the project presented in 'Capitalism and Schizophrenia' is an analysis of the state of modern subjectivity from the perspective of an attempt to provide a greater degree of freedom of expression and action for the subject, one which particularly includes the related aim of its liberation from the current nature of its constitution, primarily in relation to psychoanalytical and anthropological perspectives provided in the first volume but from that of an even wider series in the second volume, including those of aesthetics and that of a more

¹ Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, p. 122.

² Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, 1. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen. R. Lane (London: The Athlone Press, 1984; originally published in 1972). 2. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, translated by Brian Massumi (London: The Athlone Press, 1988; originally published in 1980).

explicitly articulated form of naturalist philosophy, as already encountered in our consideration of Deleuze's approach to Spinoza.

In the present context, only a very brief consideration of elements occurring in three of the chapters, or 'plateaus' of *A Thousand Plateaus*, will be provided. We can proceed initially to an initial reference to the 'rhizome', as perhaps the best-known of a lengthy series of concepts deployed by Deleuze and Guattari since it will subsequently be connected in our discussion hereto a later consideration of aspects of Manuel Castells's trilogy devoted to what he terms, in the first volume of his trilogy on 'The Information Age', as the 'Network Society'¹. Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the rhizome and the rhizomatic is presented in terms of an antagonistic approach to the 'arboreal', exemplified by the structuralist 'binary logic'² of the linguistics of Noam Chomsky, itself selected as a negatively characterised polemical target for initial criticism. An alternative position is then developed in the direction of various conceptualisations of post-Bergsonian multiplicities from the perspective of an approach already substantially developed in *Anti-Oedipus*. Deleuze and Guattari's own approach has often been viewed as naively anarchistic in its encouragement of a specific conceptualisation of 'desire', or 'desiring-production' as it is referred to in *Anti-Oedipus*, in terms of the substantially Reichian connection made there between the political perspective of Marx and the psychoanalytical perspective of Freud, one which characterises 'desire' as the necessary driving force in a truly liberated and productive society.

The difference between arboreal structures and the multiplicitous root of the rhizome as conceptualised in Deleuze and Guattari's approach might be seen in very general terms as expressing a differentiation between a context of social communications which can only take place through a centralised, organised, essentially hierarchical social structure and one where communication can be achieved without any such mediation, a socio-political attitude which indicates strong affinities with Negri's aversion to 'mediation', as indicated earlier, but also indirectly, as we shall see, to the nature of practical social communication in the developing model of contemporary society presented two decades later, in rather more sober and straightforward terms in Manuel Castells's conceptualisation of the network society.

One might also note or recall for the more familiar reader, at this point, how Deleuze and Guattari develop their use of naturalistic terms for the concepts they employ, from the notion of 'plateau' derived from Gregory Bateson in *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*³ to the 'rhizome' we have briefly considered and that in addition to elements of polemical presentation derived from groups such as the S.I, as previously referred to, *A Thousand Plateaus* also bears a quite noticeable similarity of approach to Michel de Certeau's notion in *The Practice of Everyday Life*, of heavily exploited and surveilled social subjects adopting 'tactics' in relation to the 'strategies' of those who control the territory they inhabit.

¹ Manuel Castells, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. I. The Rise of the Network Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); *Vol. II. The Power of Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); *Vol. III. End of Millennium* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).

² Deleuze & Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 4.

³ Gregory Bateson, *Steps Towards an Ecology of Mind* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1972).

Questions of subjectivity and social space in Deleuze and Guattari will be further discussed shortly but we can now move directly to our second area of consideration, this time constituted by aspects of the eleventh chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus*, '1837: The Refrain'.¹ This chapter in, a manner perhaps distantly comparable to Kant's philosophical approach in the *Critique of Judgement*, brings the conceptual characterisation of natural and artistic or aesthetic elements (in the broad sense identified by Cascardi in connection with the third *Critique*) into particularly close combination. As with the preceding, very brief, discussion of the 'rhizome', consideration of those aspects of this chapter thought relevant to our broader argument will be kept to a minimum but the primary aim is to show how in a certain sense the ethological attitude partly articulated in Deleuze's shorter book on Spinoza and, in *A Thousand Plateaus* in connection with the work of von Uexküll, is approached from a perspective primarily focused on the nature of the aesthetic and the aesthetics of nature.

As with all the main chapters of *A Thousand Plateaus*, '1837: On the Refrain' is prefaced by the reproduction of a visual image, in this case that of a painting by the modernist artist Paul Klee, whose work and whose comments on art and its significance constitute a favoured point of reference in the book. The painting in question, dated 1922, is entitled 'The Twittering Machine', conveying on the part of Deleuze and Guattari not so much an inadvertently prophetic forerunner of the later informational age Twitter (although this observation again invites partial comparison to the relation of the conceptualisation of the rhizome to Castell's characterisation of networking and the network society) as much as a desire to combine the non-organic, 'machinic'² elements of the cosmos Deleuze and Guattari's preferred, less organic-sounding term, which is subsequently employed in the chapter, with a more traditionally organic approach to relations between nature, or the cosmos, and human society, politics, and art.

An equally emphasised connection in this context is also made with the work of another artist, and another favoured example for Deleuze and Guattari's purposes, the musical composer Oliver Messiaen, an approximate contemporary of Klee. The opening paragraph of the main written text of the chapter is occupied by a verbal depiction of a young child singing under his breath in order to comfort himself in the darkness. The paragraph closes with a reference to 'the song of Orpheus'. The initial characterisation provided here is of the construction – by the child, or by Orpheus, or any comparable form of singing being, such as a bird – of a form of 'interior space', a term which would again appear to indicate a conceptual proximity to that of social subjectivity as conceived in the overall schema of 'Capitalism and Schizophrenia', although in close proximity to the natural, as distinct from human, roots or equivalents of that notion.³

The basic function of this interior space is conveyed as that of allowing such a being to feel at home in the world, but its form is then discussed in somewhat greater detail in terms of a range of concepts brought into play at various stages in the book, all of them presented as not necessarily being familiar to the reader since in the introductory chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus* the reader is invited to read the ensuing chapters of the book in whatever order they choose. The concepts thus introduced in the book are

¹ Deleuze & Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 310-350.

² *Ibid.*, p. 22.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 311.

thus provided with a very distinctive form of challenging and mischievous indeterminacy (the opening illustration in *Anti-Oedipus* is essentially of an exuberantly, potentially both naughty and creative *Boy with Machine*).¹ The concepts in question include those particularly associated with musical composition, such as speed, rhythm, or harmony but they are again developed in relation to other concepts and terms used in what might be characterised as a more tendentially metaphysical sense. This includes relations between ‘milieus’ and ‘rhythms’: ‘The milieus are open to chaos, which threatens them with exhaustion or intrusion. Rhythm is the milieus’ answer to chaos. What chaos and rhythm have in common is the in-between – between the milieus, rhythm-chaos or the chaosmos’.²

Just as Deleuze and Guattari’s discourse might be seen as indicating an interest in perspectives derived from discourses associated with the natural sciences, they can also be viewed as providing a version of Nietzsche’s particular and considerably influential philosophical development of the distinction between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, as made by earlier German thinkers working in the context of a philosophy of aesthetics, notably J.G. Hamann, a strand of thinking indicated in part by their deployment of James Joyce’s portmanteau word ‘chaosmos’, one which draws attention to the fact that chaos itself might be regarded as a form of process or osmosis. Joyce, one might also note, is an approximate contemporary of both Klee and Messiaen, so that by the end of the first page of the eleventh chapter painting, music and writing have been partly connected in terms of their possible socio-historical contextualisation as modernist artistic expressions of human relations to the cosmos, or ‘chaosmos’ developed in one aspect in Guattari’s *Chaosmosis: an ethico-aesthetic paradigm*.³ This sense of an improvised notion of adjustment and combination or connection can be seen as central to Deleuze and Guattari’s own philosophical stance throughout the book, not merely to their description of certain artistic or natural processes.

The ethological elements of the chapter are primarily articulated in relation to three prominent figures in the development of ethology, namely, Niko Tinbergen, famous for his studies of the behavioural characteristics of birds, the equally well-known Konrad Lorenz and, as indicated previously, Jakob von Uexküll. The behaviour of birds is then related, through a specific example, to the familiar bio-zoological conceptualisation of ‘territory’, although a reader already familiar with earlier chapters of the book, or with *Anti-Oedipus*, might already be expected to be making connections with Deleuze and Guattari’s specific conceptualisation and deployment of the concept of ‘territory’ through its somewhat more active-sounding, process-oriented, lexical cousin, ‘territorialisation’ and the closely related, active verbal forms ‘reterritorialize’ and ‘re-territorialized’.

These terms refer us to what might be viewed as a noticeably anthropological approach to the development of modern social relations, particularly in the contemporary form of capitalism, as characterised, not only in relation to the deterritorialization of the subject in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms but also to more traditionally structuralist notions of cultural coding. Thus, to provide the best known general conceptual deployment of these terms, capitalism is seen, rather as from the perspective provided by

¹ Painting *Boy with Machine* by Richard Lindner (1954), private collection.

² Deleuze & Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 311.

³ Félix Guattari, *Chaosmosis: an ethico-aesthetic paradigm* (Sydney: Power Publications, 1995; originally published in 1992).

Marx, as deterritorializing the subjective territory of the feudal order in an, at least potentially, emancipatory fashion of which Marx as well as Deleuze and Guattari would seem to approve, but then having broken down the old, feudal codes, reterritorializing on the new modern, 'capitalist' subject by subjecting the new form of subjectivity to cultural codes. The latter are based on what Deleuze and Guattari sometimes term 'the cynical axiomatic of capitalism'¹ in relation to the social implications of the development of the profit-motive.

A specific example of the expression of some of the relations found in 'nature', as partly distinct from human society can be provided by way of the following passage, which characterises how one type of bird creates its territory:

a territory is constituted at the same time as expressive qualities are selected or produced. The brown stagemaker (*Scenopoetes dentirostris*) lays down landmarks each morning by dropping leaves it picks from its tree, and then turning them upside down so the paler underside stands out against the dirt: inversion produces a matter of expression.²

The primary reason for selecting this passage is its final word, 'expression', indicative of a partial connection to the form of naturalism and 'expressionism' which Deleuze seeks to develop in his analysis of Spinoza's thinking in *Expressionism and Philosophy: Spinoza*, but developed here in the direction of an animal as artist. The bird referred to in the passage presents aspects of behaviour in relation to territorial marking which, as its name indicates, have been readily perceived as approximating in considerable detail to those of humans in what is usually seen as an 'artistic' context. This eleventh chapter or plateau of *A Thousand Plateaus* subsequently develops into a form of speculative analysis and interpretive description of the history of human art, partially categorised, for Deleuze and Guattari's purposes, into its various phases, notably the classical, the romantic, and the modern, proceeding to indicate how the formal considerations and relations considered in the initial context of 'nature', a concept which is itself both explored and developed throughout the book as a whole, are further developed in relation to the human developments embodied in the three artistic epochs indicated.³

This second brief consideration of aspects of *A Thousand Plateaus* has attempted to indicate an example of how a naturalist approach to social relations, partly explored in Deleuze's treatment of Spinoza is further developed in the later collaboration with Guattari in particular relation to conceptualisations of the nature of art as a particularly complex form of expressionism, in the sense provided in the books on Spinoza. Our third and final brief visit to *A Thousand Plateaus* concerns itself with the penultimate chapter, '1440: The Smooth and the Striated',⁴ which specifically focuses on conceptualisations of forms of space in connection with notions of subjectivity and related concerns. Deleuze and Guattari's distinction between smooth and striated space is, like other initially oppositional distinctions in *A Thousand Plateaus*, rapidly developed into a multiplicity of combinations partly in relation to distinctions made in previous chap-

¹ See Deleuze & Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*: 13: '7000 B.C.: Apparatus of Capture', pp. 460-473.

² *Ibid.*, p. 315.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 337-350.

⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 474-500.

ters. An immediate, simultaneous, connection and distinction is made with and between 'nomad and sedentary' space as explored in the preceding two chapters of the book with a related insistence that the two types of space as distinguished cannot be considered primarily in terms of abstract purities but rather as tendencies which occur in various forms of combination.

The chapter proceeds to explore the nature and implications of the distinction in relation to a series of models with 'The Technological Model' providing the starting point. The composition of fabric in terms of 'a certain number of characteristics that permit us to define it as a striated space'¹ shifts that characterisation into one predominantly related to earlier oppositions established in the book in terms of those between 'major' or 'royal science' and the dominant, organising tendencies of 'State apparatus'.² These distinctions, developed in various ways throughout the book tend in the direction of looking towards ways in which 'minor', less officially recognised forms can offer the potential to at least partially liberate, through specific combinations forms of connection with the major, the more restricting elements of a dominant culture, characterised variously by terms such as 'royal science' or 'State apparatus'. In this respect, as previously observed, Deleuze and Guattari's approach can again be viewed as bearing significant similarities both to aspects of Situationist thinking and that of the central, 'spatial' sections of Certeau's *The Practice of Everyday Life*.

Here 'the model of weaving' both as the process used for producing fabric but also as employed by Plato as a paradigm for 'the art of governing people' is distinguished from the composition of felt, where a particularly prominent oppositional distinction, that between the 'molar' and 'molecular', here essentially expressed as that between macro-levels and micro-levels, comes into play. The composition of felt as a material produced more in terms of the composition of a smooth space is one where 'What becomes entangled are the micro scales of the fibres'³ and where, in principle, there is no organised limitation of dimensions. This characterisation again indicates a certain proximity to the anarchic modes of resistance to the dominant culture expressed both in the work of Debord and closely related thinkers, as well as that between the broader, 'strategic' nature of dominant cultural organisation and the apparently simpler but, at a micro-level, more intricately complex 'tactical' thinking or behaviour of those who are dominated and moving on already occupied ground in the discussion provided in the relevant chapters of Certeau's *The Practice of Everyday Life*.

In partial contrast to these approaches, Deleuze and Guattari tend towards an emphasis on the possibility of an 'outside', not immediately, but potentially dangerous to the dominant cultural dispensation. An 'outside' of this kind, it can be argued, partly emerges in aspects of the work of J.H. Prynne and Paul Carter, though in forms which are not presented as immediately threatening to the organised order of current social relations. Deleuze and Guattari's socio-political attitude in *A Thousand Plateaus* is often remarked upon as being somewhat less aggressively anarchic in tone and approach than that of its partner and predecessor volume, *Anti-Oedipus*, itself brought into being somewhat closer to the socio-political heat of the 'events' of 1968. A series of related 'models' are subsequently explored in the chapter in relation to notions of 'striated' and 'smooth' space as initially introduced, as always in *A Thousand Plateaus*, in close relation to one another, despite the initial distinction made in terms of the subsequent series of models

¹ Deleuze & Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 475.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.